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BREAKING DOWN STATUS 
KAIPONANEA T. MATSUMURA* 
ABSTRACT 
The law regulates some of society’s most significant relationships 
through status. Yet social and legal changes can diminish a status’s 
effectiveness and importance. The debates surrounding worker 
classification and nonmarital relationship recognition provide two pressing 
examples. By some estimates, over one quarter of all U.S. workers are part 
of the gig economy. If these gig workers are classified as employees, many 
rights will flow to them by virtue of that status; if they are instead classified 
as independent contractors, they get almost none of them. This binary 
approach exists in the family law context as well. Over 35 million adults are 
in committed nonmarital relationships marked by some combination of 
physical or emotional intimacy, property sharing, cohabitation, and shared 
childrearing. But the law will treat the overwhelming majority of them as 
single, meaning that unlike spouses, they will find themselves without legal 
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protections and subsidies throughout the relationship and at its end. The 
problem in both contexts is a mismatch between established statuses and 
emerging social realities. 
This Article investigates the persistence of status-based regulation 
through the lenses of employment and marriage. In doing so, it makes four 
contributions. First, it identifies the relevant features of status and the 
tradeoffs inherent in regulating through status. Second, using the examples 
of gig workers and nonmarital partners, it shows how the features of status 
lead to the emergence of regulatory voids. Third, it argues that status-based 
regulation is inevitable, both because of practical political considerations 
and because the most obvious alternative to status-based regulation, 
contract, is necessarily shaped by the relational context and therefore 
devolves to status. Fourth, with reform as the only possibility, the Article 
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INTRODUCTION 
In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, William Blackstone 
organized the private economic rights of persons into “three great relations,” 
that of husband and wife, master and servant, and parent and child. 1 
“Employer” and “employee” have replaced “master” and “servant” in 
modern parlance,2 so it may seem odd from our current perspective to group 
the master-servant relation with others that we now consider family 
relationships. But servants lived and worked as members of a household in 
England and the American colonies throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. At the time, “[t]he notion of a labor market in which 
individuals freely sold their labor did not exist,” and “until the nineteenth 
century, there were practically no people in employment relationships.”3 
The head of a household—always a man—was charged with the duty and 
granted the corresponding authority to “maintain[] a well-governed home,” 
which was composed of “spouses and their offspring, apprentices, servants, 
 
1. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *410.  
2. Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How 
It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 302 (2001). 
3. KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE 
CHANGING WORKPLACE 13, 14 (2004) (noting that “[m]erchants, artisans, and members of the learned 
professions all engaged in remunerative activities, but they did not work for wages”). 











‘bound-out’ youths, and other dependents . . . .”4  Whether agrarian or 
mercantilist, the household was the unit of economic production, meeting 
the financial and support needs of its members.5 The status of householder 
also gave a man political significance, making him “the sovereign of a 
domain, able to meet with other rulers and to participate with them in 
government.” 6  Blackstonian statuses therefore bound up personal, 
economic, and political duties and located them within the home.  
Although the status of master and servant has migrated outside the home, 
leaving behind the status of husband and wife, both have undergone several 
similar developments since Blackstone’s time. Now known as employment 
and marriage, they have become more contractual in nature, tolerating 
significant customization. They have become easier to exit and 
correspondingly less permanent. They have also inched away from their 
hierarchical social meanings. Nevertheless, both retain aspects of status. 
Whether someone is an employee or spouse still triggers mandatory rights 
and duties between the parties, as well as between the parties and the state.  
Status can be an effective regulatory tool because the status 
determination gives the status holders and third parties that interact with 
them clarity about their rights and obligations. When status works, it 
becomes a powerful organizing principle that fades into the background—
many people in this country, for instance, are lucky enough not to question 
their citizenship and all the rights that follow from it. 7  Despite Henry 
Sumner Maine’s oft-quoted pronouncement that “the movement of the 
progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to 
Contract,”8 status still abounds: as we move through the world, the law 
 
4. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 5 (1985). 
5. See id. at 4 (“Family responsibilities ranged from economic production and the transmission 
of estates to craft training and dependent care.”); see also Janet Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage (I): 
From Status/Contract to the Marriage System, 6 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1, 8 (2010). Indeed, 
successful households met the dependency needs of others who could not support their own. Men who 
could not sustain their own households, as well as single women between the ages of twelve and forty, 
could be “compel[ed] by two justices to go out to service, for the promotion of honest industry. . . .” 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *413. 
6. HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 101 (2000). 
7. This is not to say that immigration law is immune from problems similar to the work and 
family law contexts. The DACA program arose in large part to provide legal protections to people who 
are functionally similar to citizens. See Angela M. Banks, Respectability & the Quest for Citizenship, 83 
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2017). “Dreamers” are only one visible subset of immigrants with “liminal” 
legal status, those who move in and out of different formal legal statuses, or who struggle to access the 
full benefits of citizenship. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Producing Liminal Legality, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 
709, 710, 713, 718–30 (2015); see also Cecilia Menjívar, Liminal Legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
Immigrants’ Lives in the United States, 111 AM. J. SOC. 999, 100 & passim (2006) (describing the 
liminal status of Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrants whose temporary legal status is uncertain and 
exploring the effects of that uncertainty on their lives). 












continues to respond to us as citizens, spouses, employees, tenants, patients, 
parents, clients, limited partners, and more. 
The very features of status that make it effective can also result in 
ossification, encumbering its response to inevitable social change. Status 
depends on identity categories that can become contested or rendered 
obsolete. Its mandatory, bundled nature hampers its ability to adapt to 
changed circumstances. And the inequalities that flow from its mandatory 
rules invite contestation. The juxtaposition of employment and marriage 
casts these shortcomings of status-based regulation in sharp relief.9  
Every person who works for a wage is either an employee or an 
independent contractor—nothing in between. The rapid evolution of the 
online “gig” economy in the last decade has revealed the limits of work 
law’s binary approach to employees.10 By some estimates, between one 
quarter and one third of all U.S. workers are part of the gig economy—for 
instance, they may drive for Uber or deliver packages for Amazon. 11 
Employees are entitled to many legal protections from their employers, such 
as reimbursement for expenses and a minimum wage, while independent 
contractors are entitled to virtually none.12 Technology companies classify 
most gig workers as independent contractors, a status that some workers 
have contested through lawsuits and political mobilization. These are high-
stakes disputes. To characterize these workers as employees would cost 
 
9. These shared classification challenges have largely been analyzed in isolation. A few 
scholars have broadly compared employment status and marital status. See, e.g., Marion Crain, Arm’s-
Length Intimacy: Employment as Relationship, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 163 (2011); Stephen Nayak-
Young, Revising the Roles of Master and Servant: A Theory of Work Law, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1223 
(2015). Some have observed how employment law helps to produce the distinction between economic 
and non-economic work. See Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and 
the Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 862 (2008). And other 
scholars have observed the common status origins of employees and spouses. See Janet Halley, What Is 
Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 2 (2011) (arguing that wives and servants 
were “not just subordinate; they were similarly subordinate”). But I am not aware of any articles on 
worker classification that discuss relationship classification or any articles on relationship classification 
that discuss worker classification. 
10. See V.B. Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker 
Identities, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 65, 67 (2017) (noting the relationship between current gig economy 
workers and the longstanding debate over whether taxi drivers are more like employees or independent 
contractors). 
11. See EDISON RSCH., THE GIG ECONOMY 2 (Dec. 2018), http://www.edisonresearch.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/Gig-Economy-2018-Marketplace-Edison-Research-Poll-FINAL.pdf [https://p 
erma.cc/65VE-VSV4] (24% of Americans earn income by working in the gig economy); James Manyika 
et al., Independent Work: Choice, Necessity, and the Gig Economy, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST. (Oct. 10, 
2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/employment-and-growth/independent-work-choic 
e-necessity-and-the-gig-economy# [https://perma.cc/4AVT-J9ZH] (concluding that 20–30% of the 
working age population in Europe and the United States engages in some form of gig work); TJ McCue, 
57 Million U.S. Workers Are Part of the Gig Economy, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://www.f 
orbes.com/sites/tjmccue/2018/08/31/57-million-u-s-workers-are-part-of-the-gig-economy/#2851e5e37 
118 [https://perma.cc/3Y2D-CLDQ].  
12. See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 











companies hundreds of millions of dollars and potentially drive them out of 
business; but the opposite conclusion leaves millions of workers ineligible 
for valuable benefits. The challenge is that many of these workers do not 
look like either traditional employees or independent contractors. Gig 
workers often work as little or as much as they want, often simultaneously 
for multiple firms, sometimes even for direct competitors; yet many do not 
perform tasks requiring special skills, exercise very little discretion in the 
work that they do, and can be terminated if they fail to adhere to the 
company’s precise guidelines.13 These facts led one judge in an employee 
misclassification case to observe that the jury would be “handed a square 
peg and asked to choose between two round holes.”14 
In the family law context, informal nonmarital relationships are the 
square peg; singleness and marriage are the two round holes. An informal 
relationship may involve emotional and sexual intimacy, commitment, 
resource sharing, cohabitation, and joint childrearing, but it may not involve 
all of those things. Over thirty-five million adults in the United States are in 
these types of relationships.15 People in these relationships are clearly not 
single as a practical matter, but they have not taken the consequential step 
of formalizing their relationships through marriage. Like the designation of 
“employee,” the formal status of marriage is the gateway to thousands of 
legal rights and responsibilities, such as inheritance, favorable tax treatment, 
standing to sue for various torts, and qualification for family leave and 
Social Security retirement benefits. 16  That means that people in 
relationships bearing various degrees of similarity to marriage will find 
themselves without legal protections, subsidies, and obligations throughout 
the relationship and at its end.  
New social arrangements render millions of individuals illegible to the 
binary and heavily laden statuses of employment and marriage. Some 
individuals find freedom in this void in that they owe fewer duties than they 
would if their relationships were regulated. Others find their socioeconomic 
and personal vulnerabilities magnified.  
If status is the problem, one response might be to turn to contract law as 
a solution. Although status-based regulation has persisted since Maine’s 
pronouncement 150 years ago, Maine was surely correct that legal relations 
previously governed by status have become more contractual, in the sense 
that they tolerate greater individual customization.17 Why not go all the way 
 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 1081. 
15. Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Consent to Intimate Regulation, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1013 
(2018) (combining cohabitants and individuals living apart in committed relationships). 
16. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 669–70 (2015). 
17. See Brian H. Bix, Private Ordering and Family Law, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 249, 260–












and entrust the parties with control over the legal consequences of their 
relationship, shedding some unfortunate historical baggage in the process?  
For various reasons, however, regulation of these relationships through 
contract is not the option it seems at first glance. Either because of a desire 
to efficiently administer legal entitlements, privatize dependency, protect 
parties with less bargaining power, or control the meaning of the 
relationship itself, lawmakers have shown little interest in loosening their 
grip on these societally important relationships.  
But even if the law were to embrace a contractual approach, the nature 
of the underlying relationships would inevitably exert influence over the 
administration of legal obligations in status-like ways. Although contract 
law largely respects individual choice, the doctrine retains mandatory 
aspects. Through doctrines such as unconscionability and public policy, the 
law imposes limits on the terms to which parties can agree. 18  Rules 
governing who can enter into agreements and under what circumstances 
regulate the conduct of the contracting parties, making them more than legal 
strangers even if they are transacting at arm’s length.19 Even the act of 
interpreting the terms of the parties’ agreement requires a court to consider 
the context in which the promises were made, which means that aspects of 
the relationship itself might comprise the terms of the exchange.20 Legal 
rules based on these archetypal relationships arise, such as rules preventing 
cohabitants from contracting for marital-like financial obligations based on 
the performance of domestic labor.21 Contract folds back into status.22 
If some degree of status-based regulation is inevitable, the question is 
not whether to regulate through status, but how. That inquiry is complicated, 
however, because status is undertheorized. In contrast to the contract end of 
the contract/status binary, which has been deconstructed and reconstructed 
repeatedly in the scholarly literature,23 the meaning of status has largely 
 
18. See, e.g., Jacob Hale Russell, Unconscionability’s Greatly Exaggerated Death, 53 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 965 (2019) (unconscionability); Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Public Policing of Intimate 
Agreements, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 159 (2013) (public policy). 
19. See Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 
1000 (1985). 
20. See Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
877, 881–82 (2000) (describing the tenets of relational contract theory, first of which is that transactions 
are embedded in social relations).  
21. See Albertina Antognini, Nonmarital Contracts, 73 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (on 
file with author). 
22. I will explain and defend this claim in Part III, infra. 
23. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1985) (identifying 
and arguing against the assumptions of classical contract theory); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF 
CONTRACT 6–7 & passim (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 1995) (discussing the birth and death of classical 
contract doctrine); Dalton, supra note 19 (performing one such deconstruction). 











been assumed to be in opposition to contract.24 Status, as I have been using 
the term up to this point, is a form of legal governance; a way of imposing 
a fixed bundle of rights and obligations based on a discernable 
characteristic. But it has multiple overlapping meanings, any of which might 
be invoked by courts and scholars at any given moment. Maine, for instance, 
uses status to describe legal obligations that are fixed by virtue of one’s 
relationship to the head of the family.25 Implicit in this patriarchal model are 
the identities themselves—wives, children, slaves—which denote greater or 
lesser social standing.26 Thus, status can describe specific identities or social 
hierarchies in addition to the package of legal consequences that flows from 
the determination that one belongs to a given legal category. The goal of 
this Article is to explore how to reform status as a regulatory device, but 
these other meanings inevitably complicate that project. The fight over 
same-sex marriage, for instance, was both a fight over access to a package 
of legal rights and a fight for social respectability.27 
In pursuing its goal, this Article makes four contributions. First, it 
defines status by unraveling its different features and exploring their 
interrelationship. This exercise lays bare the stakes of a status 
determination, which involves tradeoffs between promoting autonomy, 
addressing vulnerability, and regulating conduct efficiently. Second, it 
documents the ways in which status’s bundled, mandatory features can 
render it out of step with social change, leading to the emergence of 
regulatory voids. Third, it shows that contract doctrine itself has embedded 
within it significant aspects of status, making it impossible to avoid the 
types of policy questions that underlie status-based regulation.  
These contributions ground the fourth, which is to identify the 
mechanisms by which statuses can be adjusted to accomplish the state’s 
regulatory goals. Comparing worker classification and relationship 
recognition proves instructive, in that they reveal institutional design 
questions that apply whenever established statuses begin to fray.28 First, 
 
24. There are a few recent and notable exceptions. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & Elizabeth S. Scott, 
Reinterpreting the Status-Contract Divide: The Case of Fiduciaries, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND 
FIDUCIARY LAW 51 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2017); Paul B. Miller, The Idea of Status in 
Fiduciary Law, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 25 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold 
eds., 2017). 
25. See MAINE, supra note 8, at 123–36, 167. 
26. See id. 
27. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 669 (2015) (noting that marriage provides 
“symbolic recognition and material benefits”); see also id. at 656, 668 (noting that marriage “promise[s] 
nobility and dignity” and that the deprivation of marriage would stigmatize same-sex families as 
“somehow lesser”). 
28. For example, the presence of undocumented minors who have assimilated into this country 
tests the boundaries of citizenship. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary 













aggregation or disaggregation: how to tailor the package of legal 
consequences associated with the status by adding to or disaggregating 
those consequences, thereby changing the stakes of the classification.29 
Second, binarism or pluralism: whether to keep one meaningful status 
designation and its opposite (employee v. independent contractor, married 
v. single), or introduce one or more alternate statuses. Third, boundary 
policing: when and how to determine whether someone falls within the 
status, and whether to make it easy or difficult to transition in and out. 
Lurking in the background and informing the answers to all these questions 
is the fact that the statuses of marriage and employment, as well as many 
other favored statuses, frequently overlap, swaddling some individuals in 
multiple layers of legal protections while leaving others out in the cold. 
Proposals to reform a single status, while valuable, only partially address 
the primary values of autonomy and vulnerability. Deep and lasting change 
requires a comprehensive status consciousness. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a typology of the 
various meanings of status and identifies the core features of legal status. It 
also lays out the stakes of regulating through status. Part II uses marriage 
and employment to show how the very features of status can sometimes 
undermine its effectiveness. Part III takes a step back and reflects on a 
broader question: is it possible not to regulate through status? This Part 
shows that the temptations of regulating through status are simply too great 
for partisans to ignore, and further, that the law inevitably takes 
relationships into account when imposing consequences, importing critical 
features of status and making it impossible to escape some version of status-
based regulation. Part IV charts a path forward by identifying institutional 
design questions to guide reform efforts.  
 
(June 15, 2012), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/PD-children-DHS-PR-2012-06-15. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/F9PY-Z7T8] (noting the unjustness of removing from the country young people 
who were brought to the country as children, do not pose a security risk, and are productive members of 
society). Adults who care for children without a formal legal relationship test the boundaries of parental 
status. See Michael J. Higdon, The Quasi-Parent Conundrum, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 941, 951–78 (2019) 
(documenting the various situations in which functional parenting claims by non-legal parents arise); 
Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 48, 53–59 (2007) (noting, 
despite the presumption that a child will have two and only two parents, that many children may have 
“significant family ties to more than two adults concurrently”). 
29. See Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, The Integrity of Marriage, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 453, 
494 (2019) (analyzing costs and benefits of preserving marriage as a single status); Guy Davidov, The 
Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: ‘Employee’ as a Viable (Though Over-used) Legal 
Concept, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW 133, 134 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille 
eds., 2006) (arguing that an employment status is necessary as an organizing principle). 











I. DEFINING STATUS 
The concept of status has been used loosely to refer to a range of 
interrelated legal and non-legal phenomena, so discussions of status tend to 
be shifting and imprecise. Although conceptually distinct, these various 
features often combine to produce thick institutions, constructs of rules, 
norms, and practices that “facilitate or constrain behavior, coordinate action, 
delegate or allocate decisionmaking authority, create or maintain identity, 
intermediate between groups and between individuals and the state, [and] 
constitute social reality.”30 This Part teases out and examines the features of 
status as well as the stakes of status-based regulation. 
A. Features 
Maine’s status-to-contract construct has proven to be a generative one in 
the study of the way statuses function in the law, so it provides a good 
starting point. Maine noticed a general trend in “primitive” societies to 
organize legal relations around the patriarchal family, rather than the 
individual.31 This family structure not only governed the legal relationships 
between members, subordinating women to their male family members, but 
also the relationships of guardians and wards, household slaves, and more.32 
Familial roles not only triggered rights and duties within the family but also 
shaped private law obligations.33  
This was the “status” from which Maine’s “modern” law escaped. By 
“contract,” Maine was not referring to classical contract doctrine in 
particular but legal obligations oriented around individuals and based on 
their free agreement.34 The evolution from a fixed law of succession to 
 
30. Darrell A. H. Miller, Institutions and the Second Amendment, 66 DUKE L.J. 69, 88 (2016); 
see also id. at 91 (noting that “thick” institutions are often “textually specified,” with highly stable and 
observable rules, customs, and norms). 
31. See MAINE, supra note 8, at 123. 
32. Id. at 154, 159–67. As Hendrik Hartog has noted, to be married was to become a wife or 
husband: “The past was extinguished, annihilated, ‘sunk or drowned’ into the deed. . . . Once married, 
you had only the rights and remedies derived from an identity as a wife or husband.” HARTOG, supra 
note 6, at 99. 
33. See MAINE, supra note 8, at 134. “[P]ublic authorities set the terms of the marriage”: “its 
obligations were fixed[.]” NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 
11 (2000). Likewise, being a servant led to a predetermined set of rights and responsibilities 
characterized by the servant’s subservience and dependence. See Carlson, supra note 2, at 302. 
34. See MAINE, supra note 8, at 168. See also Halley, supra note 5, at 15 (noting that contracts 
are not entirely private and that Maine’s concept of contract was not the opposite of status but its 
supplement); Katharina Isabel Schmidt, Henry Maine’s “Modern Law”: From Status to Contract and 
Back Again?, 65 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 145, 155 (2017) (“What Maine really intended with his 
juxtaposition of status and contract had been to draw attention to the contrast between ‘primitive’ 












testamentary disposition provides an example of this elevation of individual 
will.35 
Maine’s “status” had at least five separate features. First, legal rules 
flowed from a particular identity, like paterfamilias or wife. Second, they 
were bundled: one’s identity triggered various types of legal obligations. 
Third, the legal rules were mandatory. Fourth, the relationships governed 
by status were hierarchical: the fixed legal relationships conferred authority 
on some to subordinate others.36 And fifth, status had a clearly defined 
social meaning.37 
When discussing status, courts and scholars have carried forward and 
modified these various features since Maine elaborated them. Critically, 
there is little dialogue,38 much less consensus, on whether and to what extent 
these aspects define or merely describe status. This Part begins that 
discussion. 
First, status refers to legal rules that flow from a particular identity. 
Maine associated status with innate identities, such as infancy or lunacy.39 
Such identities either flowed from accidents of birth, or became salient 
because of a desire to protect categories of persons who (in the view of those 
at the time) lacked “the faculty of forming a judgment in their own 
interest.”40 Even today, status flowing from innate characteristics that fall 
beyond one’s control strikes some scholars as especially status-like: 
Katharine Silbaugh, for example, has called it “the most offensive sort of 
status.”41 The objection to this type of involuntary status owes to the fact 
that people are regulated without their consent and based on factors over 
 
35. See MAINE, supra note 8, at 178. 
36. See id. at 154 (noting that women were subordinated within the family); see also Tamar 
Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 798 (1983) (characterizing status as the relationship 
between a “power bearer” and “dependent”). 
37. Others have observed different, overlapping features. See Schmidt, supra note 34, at 154 
(“Status may refer to the totality of a person's rights and obligations. It may also refer to someone’s 
personal rights and obligations (e.g., being a minor or an ‘imbecile’) as opposed to their proprietary 
relations (e.g., being a tenant or an agent). Finally, it may refer to rights and obligations imposed upon 
a person by law and without his or her consent instead of voluntarily and by way of agreement.”) (citing 
FREDERICK POLLOCK, INTRODUCTION AND NOTES TO SIR HENRY MAINE’S “ANCIENT LAW” 34–36 
(1914)). Schmidt’s list overlaps significantly with my own, although it omits the hierarchical nature of 
the status relationships that I believe is inherent in Maine’s account.  
38. Dagan & Scott, supra note 24, come closest to providing an accounting of the features of 
status, although they focus on the “identitarian” and involuntary aspects without commenting on the 
relationship between those features and the positive law of status. See id. at 56. 
39. See id. at 53–54 (arguing that, to Maine, status was both comprehensive and inalienable, and 
identifying status with that extreme position); Otto Kahn-Freund, A Note on Status and Contract in 
British Labour Law, 30 MODERN L. REV. 635, 636 (1967) (arguing that Maine “gave a ‘restricted’ 
meaning to the term ‘status,’” referring to rights and obligations “which society confers or imposes upon 
individuals irrespective of their own volition”). 
40. Kahn-Freund, supra note 39, at 636. 
41. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 65, 
115 (1998). 











which they exercise no control. 42  Slavery and illegitimacy are prime 
examples.43 As a result, laws classifying based on traits assumed at birth, 
like race or sex, are largely viewed with suspicion and have fallen out of 
use,44 although a few, like those centered around disability, remain.45  
It is not clear, however, that Maine would have insisted on innateness as 
a defining feature of status. His paradigmatic example of status, the family, 
included at least one role—that of wife—that was voluntarily assumed.46 
Indeed, courts and scholars have long considered marriage a status 
notwithstanding the fact that people choose to enter it. 47  Citizenship, 
characterized by some as a so-called “true” (meaning ascriptive) status,48 
can be voluntarily altered through renunciation, immigration, and so forth.49 
Moreover, as Jack Balkin has noted, even so-called immutable identities 
like race have chosen aspects—“dress, speech, bodily movements, 
consumption patterns, etc.”—that often prompt discrimination. 50 
Ultimately, the fact that a particular identity grounds the imposition of legal 
consequences matters more than the degree to which the identity is imposed. 
As I will discuss momentarily, the defining feature of these identities is that 
 
42. See Halley, supra note 5, at 24–25 (contrasting consent with ascription, and arguing that the 
ascriptive nature of legal rules makes them more status-like). The constitutional prohibition on status 
crimes stems from the similar instinct that criminalizing traits (as opposed to conduct) over which a 
person exerts little to no control is improper. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962). 
43. See Halley, supra note 9, at 24 (noting that the legitimacy of a child flowed from the 
circumstances of her birth and affected many legal rights); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1719 (1993) (showing how the law transmitted slave status through the rule that 
“children of Blackwomen assumed the status of their mother”). 
44. See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2325 n.33 (1997). 
45. Some disabilities are acquired, but others are innate. A person born with mental incapacity 
may not be able to marry, enter into contracts, and make his own medical decisions. 
46. See MAINE, supra note 8, at 154 (discussing wives as part of the status system of the family); 
Carleton Kemp Allen, Status and Capacity, 46 L.Q. REV. 277, 284 (1930) (noting that “there are other 
cases in this catalogue [of statuses at common law] in which we cannot say that status arises 
involuntarily,” like coverture). 
47. See Halley, supra note 9, at 7–48 (tracing the reconceptualization of marriage from contract 
to status over the nineteenth century). The idea that marriage is always the product of choice is itself 
overly simplistic. See Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 957, 969 (2000) (noting the use of common law marriage as a tool to convert illicit 
sexual relationships into licit marital relationships, sometimes against the parties’ will); Melissa Murray, 
Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 21–23 (2012) (suggesting that the availability of 
marriage as a bar to prosecution for the crime of seduction effectively induced people to marry). 
48. See, e.g., Kahn-Freund, supra note 39, at 636, 639; see also Dagan & Scott, supra note 24, 
at 4 (calling citizenship “the least disputed example” of status). 
49. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (governing the renunciation of U.S. citizenship); 8 U.S.C. § 
1427 (setting forth naturalization requirements for legal permanent residents). 
50. Balkin, supra note 44, at 2323, 2325 (noting that characteristics giving rise to statuses “can 
be mutable or immutable, physical or ideological, matters of behavior or matters of appearance”); see 
also Deborah A. Widiss, Intimate Liberties and Antidiscrimination Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2083, 2110, 
2112–13 (2018) (noting that although the constitution constrains discrimination based on “key personal 












they are relational—they describe relationships between private parties or 
between individuals and the state. 
A second feature of status is that it involves the bundling of multiple 
legal rules that turn on the relevant identity. In Maynard v. Hill,51  the 
Supreme Court distinguished marriage from other contracts, which involve 
“certain, definite, fixed private rights of property,” as opposed to the 
marriage relation, which was so pervasive as to form an “institution.”52 
Bundling is implicit in scholarly characterizations of status as totalizing or 
universal,53 but has rarely been noted as a feature of status qua status. A 
simple thought experiment illustrates the degree to which bundled legal 
rights have become synonymous with status. Every legal rule depends on 
some triggering aspect. The act of using electronic communications to 
advance a scheme to defraud people, perhaps by falsifying admissions 
materials and exchanging payments in order to gain admission to elite 
universities, might support a conviction for wire fraud.54 If prosecution and 
punishment were the only consequences of such an act, most people would 
not think of “wire fraudster” as a cognizable status, in the same way that 
countless other one-off acts result in legal consequences without imputing 
status. But wire fraud is a felony, and laws imposing collateral 
consequences on convicted felons, from the loss of voting rights to the loss 
of economic benefits to the deprivation of professional licenses, coalesce in 
such a way that the felon designation becomes a status.55 The more rights 
and duties that arise by virtue of the identity, the more status-like the identity 
becomes.56 
A third feature of status is that its rules are mandatory and standardized. 
In Maynard, the Court noted that although marriage was often denominated 
a “civil contract” by courts and scholars, marriage, in contrast to contract, 
creates “a relation between the parties . . . which they cannot change.”57 
 
51. 125 U.S. 190 (1888). 
52. Id. at 210–11. 
53. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 43, at 1719–20 (describing how the various laws regulating 
slavery resulted in the total commodification of slaves).  
54. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343; see also Investigations of College Admissions and Testing Bribery 
Scheme, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (OCT. 7, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/investigations-college-a 
dmissions-and-testing-bribery-scheme [https://perma.cc/JH89-ANL6] (identifying the co-conspirators 
and criminal charges in the highly publicized college admissions prosecution). 
55. See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on 
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 154 & passim (1999); Beth A. 
Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, 65 UCLA L. REV. 2, 7–
9 (2018) (showing how economic sanctions following criminal convictions create debtors—arguably 
another status). 
56. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 670 (2015) (noting that marriage is the “basis 
for an expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities” including over 1000 federal 
laws). 
57. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 211. 











When people marry, “they have not so much entered into a contract as into 
a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon their 
agreement, but upon the general law of the state, statutory or common, 
which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations.” 58 
Numerous scholars have emphasized this aspect of status: that its rules are 
fixed by law and cannot be changed by the parties to the relationship.59 
When lawmakers transform some marital rules, such as those regarding 
property and alimony, into defaults that the spouses can alter through private 
agreement, they merely change some of the status’s core features while 
leaving others intact.60 
A less remarked corollary to the mandatory aspect of status is that the 
legal identities become standardized: the more that rights and duties are set 
forth by the state, the more consistent the meanings of those identities.61 It 
is only possible to speak of wives or parents and for those concepts to be 
legally intelligible because all members of those categories are subject to 
the same legal duties.62 
A fourth feature of status is its inevitable normativity. Statuses arise to 
govern societally important relationships. As a result, they say something 
about the nature of those relationships as well as the position of those 
relationships relative to others. 
Statuses typically involve relationships involving power differentials or 
dependency.63 These relationships can be explicitly defined by hierarchy, 
 
58. Id. (citing Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 481, 483 (1863)). 
59. See, e.g., Bix, supra note 17, at 259 (noting that “once one becomes a spouse or parent, 
certain rights and obligations follow”); Dubler, supra note 47, at 972; Halley, supra note 9, at 4 
(associating status with state investment in ascriptive rules); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family 
Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 835 (2004) (noting that status is associated with legal relations that the 
parties cannot change); Miller, supra note 24, at 27 (noting that statuses have normative meanings and 
social and moral implications beyond the determination of the parties). Statuses can clearly be comprised 
of a combination of mandatory and default rules; whether they can be comprised entirely of default rules 
presents a harder question. One could imagine a thicket of default rules so pervasive, or so deeply 
majoritarian, that the effect would be to set aspects of the status beyond the parties’ control. 
60. Statuses can clearly be comprised of a combination of mandatory and default rules (business 
associations present another example of this phenomenon, see generally Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory 
Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and Evidence from LLCs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 369, 374–80 
(1995) (noting the relationship between off-the-rack default business forms and mandatory rules)). 
Whether they can be comprised entirely of default rules presents a harder question. One could imagine 
a thicket of default rules so pervasive, or so deeply majoritarian, that the effect would be to set aspects 
of the status beyond the parties’ control. 
61. See Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34, 39 (1917) (arguing that 
the basic difference between status and contract is really standardized relations versus individualized 
relations). 
62. Cf. Dubler, supra note 47, at 974 (showing that the doctrine of common law marriage, and 
the social norms embodied in it, helped to establish the meaning of marriage more broadly). 
63. See, e.g., Kahn-Freund, supra note 39, at 640 (noting various circumstances in which “the 
law operates upon an existing contractual relation, but it moulds this relation through mandatory norms 













like employment, which is premised on the employer’s authority to control 
certain actions of the employee.64 Marriage, by contrast, now imposes duties 
in gender-neutral terms and no longer openly subjugates the wife to her 
husband.65 Of course, one might question whether such facial neutrality is 
enough to eliminate manifestations of hierarchy within the relationship due 
to the fact that such rules exist upon a foundation of different property 
entitlements,66 and whether, because of those differing entitlements, it is 
possible to completely eliminate intra-status hierarchies. But even if the law 
no longer empowers the husband to control his wife, spouses continue to 
owe each other open-ended duties of support, both financial and emotional, 
and depend on each other for their fulfilment.67 Vulnerability is therefore a 
feature of the relationship, as are the law’s prescriptions to meet that 
vulnerability.68 
Additionally, the imposition of rights/privileges and duties/disabilities 
inevitably creates inter-status hierarchies by favoring or disfavoring some 
identities over others. To be clear, status might refer to a purely social 
construct: the degree of prestige or honor that groups enjoy and that 
individuals enjoy because they are members of that group. 69  “Status 
symbols,” used in this popular sense, describes consumption goods or 
services that indicate high socioeconomic status. 70  Social status is 
conceptually separable from legal status. Balkin argues, for example, that 
“legal status . . . is primarily concerned with legal meanings and legal 
 
64. See infra notes 156–161, and accompanying text. See also Carlson, supra note 2, at 304. 
65. See Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Blackstonian Marriage, Gender, and Cohabitation, 51 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1247, 1251 (2019) (noting that marriage laws are formally equal, promoting 
interdependency instead of dependency).  
66. On the latter point, see Emily J. Stolzenberg, Properties of Intimacy, 80 MD. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021) (on file with author). 
67. See Gregg Strauss, Why the State Cannot “Abolish Marriage”: A Partial Defense of Legal 
Marriage, 90 IND. L.J. 1261, 1301 (2015) (noting that marriage imposes “imperfect duties” on the 
spouses: duties involving “(1) substantial latitude in the required conduct and (2) an intrinsic connection 
to subjective motivations”).  
68. Kahn-Freund notes that many of these relationships rest on a voluntary, if not contractual, 
foundation, see Kahn-Freund, supra note 39, at 640. Statuses stemming from the relationship between 
an individual and the state are arguably different. Yet citizenship, like these other relationships, involves 
vulnerability and also reciprocal obligations. See Dominique Leydet, Citizenship, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/citiz 
enship/ [https://perma.cc/WB4W-FSCN] (“A citizen is a member of a political community who enjoys 
the rights and assumes the duties of membership.”). Moreover, philosophers have long justified the 
state’s exercise of authority “first because we are vulnerable to the depredations of others, and second 
because we can all benefit from cooperation with others.” Ann Cudd & Seena Eftekhari, 
Contractarianism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer 2018), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism/ [https://perma.cc/4FDH-XN8R]. 
69. Balkin, supra note 44, at 2321 (citing, among others, 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND 
SOCIETY 391 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., U. of Cal. Press 1978) (4th ed. 1956)). 
70. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, When the Joneses Wear Jeans, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2005), ht 
tps://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/29/us/class/when-the-joneses-wear-jeans.html [https://perma.cc/ES4S 
-W24J].  











consequences,” and that “legal status has increasingly been divorced from 
the task of directly mapping or constituting social status categories,” citing 
the replacement of “concepts like ‘pauper’ or ‘servant’” with “‘AFDC 
recipient’ or ‘part-time employee.’”71  
However, legal status effectively reinforces social hierarchies to such an 
extent that the concepts can barely be disaggregated.72  Lawmakers will 
sometimes state, point blank, that some legal statuses are superior to others. 
The Supreme Court has told us that marriage, for example, “promise[s] 
nobility and dignity to all persons,” “offers unique fulfillment,” “is essential 
to our most profound hopes and aspirations,” and is “a two-person union 
unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.” 73 
Unsurprisingly, some commentators have criticized the opinion for 
unnecessarily denigrating single people and people in nonmarital 
relationships.74 But others would see nothing wrong with it, because, to 
them, state privileging of status goes hand in hand with status itself.75 
Rhetoric is one thing; rights and benefits are another. As the Court noted, 
marriage offers “material benefits to protect and nourish the union.”76 These 
benefits reward people who marry and leave nonmarital families 
comparatively less protected and less stable.77 In this way, marriage law 
creates hierarchy by elevating one group rather than by burdening another. 
But laws sometimes create hierarchy by imposing burdens. Until relatively 
recently, the legal system also elevated marriage by criminalizing 
extramarital sex and cohabitation, and punishing out-of-wedlock 
 
71. Balkin, supra note 44, at 2325. 
72. Although Balkin claims that the law is doing much less to prop up social status than it once 
did, he acknowledges that the law still has a powerful role, using citizenship as an example. See id. at 
2343. For an examination of the relationship between the law and the social status of workers, see Noah 
D. Zatz & Eileen Boris, Seeing Work, Envisioning Citizenship, 18 EMP. RIGHTS & EMP. POL’Y J. 95, 
102–03 & passim (2014). For a critique of the law’s centering of marriage in discourse around the family, 
see Aníbal Rosario-Lebrón, For Better and Better: The Case for Abolishing Civil Marriage, 5 WASH. 
U. JUR. REV. 189, 222–29 (2013). 
73. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 656–57, 666 (2015). 
74. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Marriage Is a Right, Not an Obligation, BLOOMBERG (June 28, 
2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-06-28/marriage-is-a-right-not-an-
obligation [https://perma.cc/6UYK-TY4L] (arguing that Justice Kennedy's discussion of loneliness 
“went too far” and “has the effect of devaluing the fullness of lives conducted outside the bounds of 
marriage”); Serena Mayeri, Marriage (In)equality and the Historical Legacies of Feminism, 6 CALIF. L. 
REV. CIRC. 126, 131–32 (2015) (observing that Obergefell ignored the feminist legacy of striking down 
laws that penalized unmarried women). 
75. See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 94–96 (1993) 
(arguing that marriage has independent moral significance because of its role in promoting relational 
identity); see also Bix, supra note 17, at 259–60, 260 n.32 (noting that some defenses of marriage depend 
on the view that marriage in a particular form is worth preserving in that form because of history and 
tradition). 
76. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 669. 












childbirth.78 Public benefits recipients, to use Balkin’s earlier example, may 
have to submit to invasive questioning about their spending and finances, 
consent to unannounced home visits and drug testing, and identify the parent 
or parents of nonmarital children for the purpose of enforcing child support 
obligations.79 These state interventions, too demeaning to impose on the 
average citizen,80 result in measurable harms to recipients, including stress, 
fear, and feelings of degradation, and send the unmistakable message that 
recipients are less worthy than others of respect.81  
True, any law that confers a benefit or imposes a disability will create 
hierarchy under this definition. But status is particularly normative in that 
these laws are both bundled and identity-based. Those aspects of status 
render the privileging or burdening of certain identities particularly salient. 
Moreover these benefits and burdens are often meant to shape conduct by 
encouraging or deterring behavior.82 Whether or not they function perfectly, 
statuses exist to promote legislative or other purposes. 
 
* * * 
 
The foregoing features define status. Attributes of each feature can make 
the status feel more or less status-like. A status comprised of comparatively 
few legal incidents, only some of which are mandatory, like tenancy, might 
 
78. Through much of the Nation’s history, marriage was the exclusive site for sex and 
procreation, policed by criminal laws prohibiting extramarital sex and property laws governing 
inheritance and making distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children. See JOANNA L. 
GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY 
AMERICA 27–77, 238–39 (2011); Ariela R. Dubler, Sexing Skinner: History and the Politics of the Right 
to Marry, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1353 (2010). 
79. See Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1389, 
1397–1400 (2012). 
80. The fact that courts have analyzed these types of investigatory practices under the Fourth 
Amendment shows that they are not completely routine. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 464 
F.3d 916, 923–26 (9th Cir. 2006).  
81. Gilman, supra note 79, at 1404; see also Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 
99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 646 (2009) (“[T]oday, some of the key purposes of welfare policies 
are to regulate the home and to degrade welfare recipients to such a degree that they are deterred from 
using welfare.”). 
82. Cf. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 54 (1977) (recognizing the possibility that Social Security 
rules that would terminate a person’s existing benefit upon marriage would impact the choice to marry, 
but contrasting the incidental impact of such rules with attempts to interfere with an individual’s decision 
to marry). Statuses do not function perfectly in this regard because individuals and policymakers alike 
may have competing incentives. See Matsumura, supra note 29, at 472–74 (noting, within the context 
of marriage, that there is substantive disagreement as to how marriage should be defined and what values 
it should promote). For instance, parental status confers privileges, like the ability to spend time with 
and make decisions concerning one’s child. But it also imposes obligations, including a duty to provide 
financial support. An individual’s desire to become a parent may therefore depend on whether he or she 
values the privileges more than the obligations. Cf. Tianna N. Gibbs, Paper Courts and Parental Rights: 
Balancing Access, Agency, and Due Process, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 549, 556 (2019) (noting that 
for unmarried fathers, in particular, acknowledging paternity involves balancing access and obligation). 











feel less status-like than marriage which, as currently constituted, feels less 
status-like than chattel slavery. 
When people invoke status, they can be referring to any of the meanings 
discussed above, including the purely social aspect, as well as any 
combination of the legal features, but they rarely intend to analyze status 
systematically. As a result, discussions about whether to alter particular 
statuses tend to talk past each other. Some accounts focus on the social 
aspects to the exclusion of the legal, or the legal aspects to the exclusion of 
the social, or some legal aspects to the exclusion of others. For example, 
one persuasive critique of the Obergefell decision is that the Court 
unnecessarily chose between competing social understandings of 
marriage—either companionate/egalitarian or gender-
differentiated/repronormative.83 The implication of this argument is that the 
Court could make changes to the legal status of marriage without disturbing 
or picking and choosing between competing social meanings. Another 
critique, coming from a different direction, is that marriage should be 
avoided, or at least viewed with suspicion, because of its disciplinary 
aspects, which now inhere in marriage’s social meaning.84 This argument 
deemphasizes the construction of marriage as a legal status except with 
regard to its normative implications. Both arguments are independently 
valuable; they just focus on selective, and different, aspects of status. 
Statuses are also linked on a deeper level. Consider the following 
example. Among firms that provide health benefits to employees, 94% offer 
coverage to spouses. 85  Approximately 40% of employers now provide 
health benefits to unmarried couples, up from approximately 30% in 2013.86 
Management level employees are more than twice as likely to receive these 
benefits as service level employees.87  
It is arguably a good thing that employers are crafting their own solutions 
to the gaps left open by marriage. But notice that unmarried employees are 
less than half as likely as married employees to receive health benefits for 
their partners. And notice further that these benefits are going to members 
of an already privileged status, employees. Unmarried non-employees are 
therefore doubly excluded.  
 
83. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 25–26 (2015). 
84. See Murray, supra note 47, at 51–52 (arguing that even as the law ceased to police the 
boundaries of marriage by criminalizing extramarital intimacy, norms of behavior control individual 
behavior). 
85. 2019 Employer Health Benefits Survey, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 29, 2019), https://www. 
kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2019-section-2-health-benefits-offer-rates/ [https://perma.cc/Z8AT-HYU 
T].  
86. Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Beyond Property: The Other Legal Consequences of Informal 
Relationships, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1325, 1339 (2019). 












This exclusion is mutually reinforcing and places many in a double bind. 
Marriage provides social and other advantages that enable men to succeed 
at work, giving them greater access to management level positions.88 Yet 
economic insecurity is one of the leading reasons that people defer 
marriage, 89  so exclusion from employee benefits only pushes marriage 
further out of reach. To marriage and employment, we could potentially add 
other statuses: citizenship; home ownership; whiteness; the list goes on.90 
B. Costs and Benefits 
The decision whether to regulate through status involves tradeoffs 
between several basic values.  
One value is autonomy. Maine’s quarrel with status, as discussed above, 
is that one’s rights were fixed by virtue of one’s place in the patriarchal 
family. The progression to “contract” was really about the triumph of 
individually chosen—as opposed to family-derived—obligations. 91 
Blackstone’s emphasis on the contractual aspects of marriage and servitude 
anticipates this critique. 92  In contrast to slavery, which he declared 
“repugnant to reason, and the principles of natural law” for the reason that 
“an absolute and unlimited power is given to the master over the life and 
 
88. See Trina Jones, Single and Childfree! Reassessing Parental and Marital Status 
Discrimination, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1253, 1269–70, 1278 (2014) (reviewing studies showing that marriage 
increases men’s wages by as much as 26%, and that positive social views about marriage (or conversely, 
negative views about the unmarried) are likely to be the cause). 
89. See infra notes 231–233, and accompanying text. I thank Emily Stolzenberg for sharpening 
this point. 
90. Although few laws explicitly classify based on race, several scholars have shown that many 
legal rules still operate to provide material benefits to white people, sometimes based on whiteness itself. 
See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329, 334–35 (2009) 
(showing that tax subsidies for housing disproportionately benefit white families); Dorothy A. Brown, 
Social Security and Marriage in Black and White, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 111, 111–13 (2004) (noting that the 
effect of the Social Security two-earner penalty is to reward white couples, or, conversely, penalize 
Black couples); Harris, supra note 43. Immigration status also draws harsh lines between those with 
access to resources and those without. The coronavirus stimulus bill passed in the spring of 2020, for 
instance, would not distribute stimulus checks to United States citizens married to undocumented 
immigrants. See Caitlin Dickerson, Married to an Undocumented Immigrant? You May Not Get a 
Stimulus Check, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/us/coronavirus-und 
ocumented-immigrants-stimulus.html [https://perma.cc/Z2QS-2SUT] (noting that the law prohibits 
stimulus payments to people who file taxes jointly with someone who uses an Individual Taxpayer 
Identification Number, commonly used by undocumented immigrants). People in the country 
provisionally also face increased prospects of exploitation and abuse, even if they have formal 
employment. Temporary workers, for example, are exposed to harsh working conditions and wage theft, 
among other injustices. See Hiroshi Motomura, The New Migration Law: Migrants, Refugees, and 
Citizens in an Anxious Age, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 457, 500 (2020). In this context, employment is not 
a shield for injustice. 
91. See supra note 34, and accompanying text. 
92. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *413 (describing the relationship between master and 
domestic servant as contractual); see id. at *421 (describing marriage as a civil contract). 











fortune of the slave,”93 Blackstone characterized marriage and servitude as 
freely chosen.94 To be sure, Blackstone’s account ignores the fact that these 
choices were made amidst conditions that practically constrained many 
people’s options. He takes for granted that some people will be “gentlemen” 
while others will be “poor,” and glosses over the fact that individuals 
without “visible livelihood” could be compelled into service.95 Yet central 
to his conception of these relationships was the idea that they were 
“willing.”96  
The inability to control whether one is a member of a particular status 
explains why ascribed statuses—statuses imposed upon people by virtue of 
their birth—are so troubling. 97  But statuses also limit autonomy by 
regulating entrance and exit as well as tailoring the package of rights and 
duties that are designed to promote desirable behavior.  
Consider employment. Despite resting on the foundation of an at-will 
contractual relationship, many aspects of the employment relationship—
including whether a worker is an employee in the first place—continue to 
be mandated by law. Whether a worker is an employee or independent 
contractor cannot be settled by the parties in advance, but can only be 
resolved by a court after the fact.98 Duties flow from employment status, 
including the employer’s right to control numerous aspects of the 
employee’s performance and the employer’s corresponding obligation to 
third parties for acts of the employee,99 as well as numerous statutory rights 
and obligations.100 
Unlike employment, spouses have greater control over whether they are 
married. The gradual liberalization of divorce laws, culminating in the 
adoption of no-fault divorce, has given spouses the power to enter and exit 
marriages at their discretion, making marriage more like other “contracts” 
 
93. Id. at *411. 
94. Marriage was contractual in the sense that it was theoretically consensual. To marry, parties 
had to establish that they were “willing to contract,” “able to contract,” and “actually did contract, in the 
proper forms and solemnities required by law.” Id. at *421. Blackstone noted that the master and servant 
status was also predicated on notions of consent. See id. at *414 (noting that minors could bind 
themselves as apprentices and describing the basis of the relationship as an exchange of money for 
training). 
95. See id. at *413–14. 
96. Id. at *422 (saying of marriage, “FIRST, they must be willing to contract”). 
97. See supra notes 41–43, and accompanying text. 
98. See Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., 
concurring) (observing the law’s reliance on a judicially administered ex post analysis). 
99. For example, employers cannot contract around liability to third parties for an employee’s 
acts committed in furtherance of the employment relationship. See 1 BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN 
TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 7:6 (2d ed. 2020) (discussing how employers cannot use 
written agreements that characterize their employees as independent contractors to escape liability). 












that can be breached by either party as they see fit.101 Yet the State has never 
ceased to enact laws centering on the marital unit. Inheritance, tort, 
evidence, and other laws turn on marital status. 102  Congress has made 
marital status relevant to over one thousand other laws.103 Most of these are 
mandatory in the sense that they cannot be altered by the parties’ agreement. 
Yet statuses can promote autonomy if the decision to enter the particular 
status is one that the parties wish to make. Courts have embraced an 
increasingly autonomy-based rationale for striking down laws restricting 
the right to marry, focusing on the importance of choice and self-definition 
at the expense of state authority.104 The same-sex couples in Obergefell, for 
instance, sought to marry “because of their respect—and need—for 
[marriage’s] privileges and responsibilities.”105 Workers, too, can attain a 
sense of purpose or belonging from being an employee, despite the 
restrictions that accompany the status.106 
A second value is efficiency. Is status the best way to regulate the 
relationship and promote social goods? One way to look at this question is 
through the lens of wealth maximization. 107  Within the employment 
 
101. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, 
Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1955 (2012) (arguing that no-fault divorce 
changed marriage significantly by making it “a choice-based relationship”). Janet Halley has noted that 
state control over entrance and exit heightens the status-ness of marriage. See Halley, supra note 5, at 
23. See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210–11 (1888) (noting, in its articulation of marriage as 
status, that the state controlled exit); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 
1443, 1445. To be clear, although states have relinquished control over divorce to a great extent, parties 
are still not free to legally dissolve their marriages without state supervision. 
102. Although courts increasingly began to recognize the ability of spouses to enter legally 
enforceable agreements regarding the property consequences of their relationship, see Singer, supra note 
101, at 1458–65, many spousal duties are nondelegable. It has long been clear, for instance, that courts 
will not enforce contracts for domestic services, see Hasday, supra note 59, at 840, or noneconomic 
duties, see Matsumura, supra note 18, at 177–90; Silbaugh, supra note 41, at 71–74. It is also important 
to note that some jurisdictions still impose limitations upon agreements, for instance, by insisting upon 
additional procedural protections like independent counsel or greater opportunities to review their 
substantive fairness. See Barbara A. Atwood & Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law for Premarital and 
Marital Agreements, 46 FAM. L.Q. 313, 321–24 & passim (2012). 
103. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 765 (2013). 
104. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (limiting the state’s ability to interfere with 
one’s choice of spouse); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (locating the choice to marry 
within the zone of constitutional privacy interests); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 665 (2015) 
(noting that “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual 
autonomy”). 
105. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 658. 
106. See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1886–92 (2000) (exploring the 
relationship between work, citizenship, community, and identity); see also Dubal, supra note 10, at 105–
09 (noting, through ethnographic research, that some taxi drivers currently classified as independent 
contractors longed for employment because of its association with worker protections and a “glorious 
labor history”). But see id. at 112–20 (noting that immigrant taxi drivers preferred the independence, 
control, and entrepreneurism that comes from being an independent contractor rather than an employee).  
107. See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 579, 605–09 (noting that mandatory status rules can be compared to individualized contract 
terms to determine which produces more optimal economic outcomes).  











context, this question finds its expression in Ronald Coase’s classic account 
of the nature of the firm, which analyzes the tradeoffs inherent in the 
decision to hire help and focus on internal production (thereby expanding 
the firm) or contract out for a particular task or product.108 The marital 
family has also been the subject of this type of economic analysis. 109 
However, I take a broader view of efficiency here, by which I mean, in 
addition to the maximization of wealth, the tendency of the bundle of rules 
to channel desired behavior, promote morality, satisfy individuals’ 
subjective desires, and more. This usage brings to mind Carl Schneider’s 
classic discussion of the functions of family law, in particular, the 
channeling function, through which “the law creates or (more often) 
supports social institutions which are thought to serve desirable ends.”110 
Not everyone agrees on these goods, and, indeed, marriage and employment 
are fertile sites of disagreement.111 That said, they unquestionably impact 
whether to regulate through status. 
A third value is protecting vulnerable parties from exploitation by 
powerful parties. The mandatory nature of status rules is a mighty 
counterweight to power imbalances. In the early nineteenth century, the 
status-based master/servant relationship was replaced by a free labor model 
in which workers negotiated rights to their labor.112 In this new world, “it 
was taken for granted that adult individuals, whether or not they happened 
to be employed in someone’s household, should be their own rather than 
their master’s responsibility.”113 Workers lost the protections of status.114 
 
108. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390–98 (1937). 
109. See, e.g., GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981) (analyzing the allocation of 
spousal resources between various domestic and market tasks); Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow 
of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509, 575–93 (1998) 
(analyzing egalitarian marriage through an economic lens and concluding that it produces various 
inefficiencies). 
110. Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 498 
(1992); see also id. at 499–503 (explaining the mechanisms by which the law performs this channeling, 
including by providing favorable legal treatment); Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby 
Carriage: Revisiting the Channeling Function of Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133, 2152–55 
(2007) (discussing the channeling function and how statuses serve their purposes). Because statuses 
impose standardized obligations, they also generate interpretive networks such as judicial precedents 
that can help to clarify the meaning of those obligations, reducing ambiguity, inconsistency, and 
incompleteness. See Ribstein, supra note 60, at 376 (noting these benefits of standard forms for business 
organizations). These interpretive networks help people to organize their lives in the ways they prefer, 
what Schneider would call the “‘facilitative’ function,” and help courts resolve disputes, what Schneider 
would call the “‘arbitral’ function.” Schneider, supra, at 497. 
111. See, e.g., Matsumura, supra note 29, at 472–73 (noting a disagreement over whether the 
primary purpose of marriage is personal and emotional fulfillment or the production and rearing of 
children); Schultz, supra note 106, at 1899–1906 (noting a debate between feminist scholars over 
whether expanding access to market employment furthers or harms women’s equality). 
112. ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN 
ENGLISH & AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350–1870 148 (1991). 
113. Id. at 155. 












Yet these changes did not disturb the parties’ preexisting legal entitlements, 
meaning that employers had even greater authority to set the terms of their 
interactions.115  
Much of the development of the employment relationship starting in the 
late nineteenth century and accelerating in the first half of the twentieth 
century responded to this vulnerability. To compete for workers, firms 
adopted hierarchical promotion schemes—hiring for only the lowest-level 
jobs and promoting from within—and corporate welfare programs, like 
pensions, profit-sharing plans, and insurance benefits.116 By the 1970s, most 
large firms created these types of internal labor markets, based on the 
implicit promise of long-term employment.117  
This private welfare system arose not only because of market forces, but 
also through the efforts of organized labor. Workers’ rights organizations 
emerged to address disparities in bargaining power between employers and 
workers. Status was seen as an antidote to exploitation, a means of 
protecting workers.118 In addition to various state-run insurance programs 
such as social security and workers’ compensation, Congress passed 
legislation creating the National Labor Relations Board based on concerns 
about inequality of bargaining power between employees and large firms,119 
and enacted antidiscrimination laws based on concerns about disparate pay 
and inequality of opportunity within firms. 120  State law has enacted 
overlapping legal protections, such as workers’ compensation and 
unemployment insurance,121  based on similar assumptions about worker 
vulnerability.  
Marriage has gradually become more egalitarian since Blackstone’s 
time. Women have won the right to hold property in their own names,122 to 
 
115. See id. at 148, 157. 
116. STONE, supra note 3, at 41–43; DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE 34–37 (2014); 
David Charny, The Employee Welfare State in Transition, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1607–08 (1996); 
Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for 
Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 530–31 (2001). 
117. Stone, supra note 116, at 532–35; see also WEIL, supra note 116, at 31–34 (explaining the 
rise of the large corporation as a response to the technological innovations that vastly increased and 
complicated production of goods). 
118. See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 
YALE L.J. 1509, 1512–13, 1518 (1981) (noting the role of unions in addressing bargaining power 
deficiencies). 
119. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
120. STONE, supra note 3, at 158–59. 
121. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3700 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.) 
(workers’ compensation); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 976 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. 
Sess.) (unemployment insurance). 
122. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ 
Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994); Allison Anna Tait, The Beginning of the End 
of Coverture: A Reappraisal of the Married Woman’s Separate Estate, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165 
(2014). 











make contracts,123 and to vote.124 Later in the twentieth century, Supreme 
Court decisions gave women more control over reproductive decision-
making and subjected laws resting on sex-based classifications to 
heightened scrutiny.125 These changes paved the way for women to enter the 
workforce and to be less dependent on marriage for their economic 
security. 126  Yet many laws turning on marital status, like tax filing, 127 
eligibility for Social Security benefits, 128  immigration, 129  public 
assistance,130 insurance, and benefits programs like workers’ compensation 
schemes131 assume that wives are dependent on their husbands’ economic 
contributions, and that laws should reflect this dependency.132 
It bears mentioning that statuses can meet dependency needs by 
privatizing that dependency, making the more economically powerful 
parties bear the costs of the economically vulnerable parties’ support. 
Within the work context, the centrality of the private welfare model has 
enabled the government to play a supporting role, providing a safety net for 
those who fall outside of the employment system.133 Likewise, the law has 
long treated the family as an important source of individual support, so 
much so that some scholars have argued that privatizing dependency is 
family law’s “ultimate” value.134 
These values—autonomy, efficiency, protection of the vulnerable—raise 
various conflicts. The challenge of managing the tension between 
dependency and autonomy is perhaps the central theme in the evolution of 
 
123. Richard H. Chused, Late Nineteenth Century Married Women’s Property Law: Reception of 
the Early Married Women’s Property Acts by Courts and Legislatures, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 3 (1985). 
124. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
125. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971) (subjecting sex-based classifications to 
heightened scrutiny); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (striking down restrictions 
on the use of contraception by married persons); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972) 
(extending the right to access contraceptives to unmarried persons); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–
54 (1973) (recognizing the right to abortion). 
126. Many scholars have noted that this progress narrative is not a simple or straightforward one, 
and that vestiges of coverture remain to this day. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 59, at 833, 842. 
127. See Anne L. Alstott, Updating the Welfare State: Marriage, the Income Tax, and Social 
Security in the Age of Individualism, 66 TAX L. REV. 695, 702–06 (2013); Grace Ganz Blumberg, 
Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1157 (1981). 
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c; see also Alstott, supra note 127, at 706–08. 
129. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a. 
130. Blumberg, supra note 127, at 1138–39. 
131. Id. at 1140. 
132. See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1417 
(1975) (tax); Naomi Cahn, The Golden Years, Gray Divorce, Pink Caretaking, and Green Money, 52 
FAM. L.Q. 57, 61–62 (2018) (reviewing various federal programs); Goodwin Liu, Social Security and 
the Treatment of Marriage: Spousal Benefits, Earnings Sharing, and the Challenge of Reform, 1999 
WIS. L. REV. 1, 21–22 (Social Security). 
133. See Charny, supra note 116, at 1601–02. 
134. Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family Support, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1835, 
1866 (2014); see also Susan Frelich Appleton, Obergefell’s Liberties: All in the Family, 77 OHIO ST. 












employment and marriage.135 Whether it is possible to address dependency 
without simultaneously promoting subordination is another.136 In a world 
where adults can cohabit without formally marrying, for example, the 
partner with greater earning power can benefit from the other’s domestic 
labor without ultimately having to share his or her property accumulated 
during the relationship.137 Some scholars have proposed that the law impose 
marriage or marriage-like obligations on the powerful partner to protect the 
vulnerable one.138 Such a solution, however, not only disregards the parties’ 
ex ante preferences, but absolves the state of the obligation to meet the 
dependency needs of its citizens. In the gig worker context, some states, like 
California, have passed laws making it much easier to classify workers as 
employees, with the goal of shifting financial responsibility for worker 
dependency onto technology companies.139 The technology companies have 
warned that if they are ultimately required to classify these workers as 
employees, the workers will, like other traditional employees, be required 
to work mandatory hours in set shifts and lose the ability to decide which 
jobs to take.140 Their dependency needs will be met at the cost of loss of 
freedom. 
 
135. Emily Stolzenberg has examined one critical manifestation of this tension—“between choice 
about obligations and privatizing dependency”—in the family law context. Emily J. Stolzenberg, The 
New Family Freedom, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1983, 1987 (2018). 
136. During Blackstone’s time, “[d]ependency was a normal part of a deferential system of rank 
and degree in which everyone, adult and child, had and knew his or her place. Every man, woman, and 
child was then bound ‘in a web of dependency and subordination to the will of others and ultimately of 
the universe.’” STEINFELD, supra note 110, at 119.  
137. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979). 
138. See, e.g., CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
221–28 (2010) (proposing to impose property obligations on cohabitants who live together for more than 
two years or have a common child, irrespective of their consent); Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist 
Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 711 (1996) (arguing for the 
revivification of common law marriage to protect vulnerable women). 
139. Assemb. B. 5, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (enacted). In November 2020, the 
California voters approved Proposition 22, which provides that app-based drivers are independent 
contractors and not employees as long as the technology company (“network company” under the 
language of the statute) does not unilaterally prescribe working times, control worker hours, or restrict 
the driver from performing services for other companies. See Cal. Proposition 22 (adding Cal. Bus. & 
Prof. Code § 7451; see also Kate Conger, Uber and Lyft Drivers in California Will Remain Independent, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/04/technology/california-uber-lyft-
prop-22.html?action=click&module=Spotlight&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/QT36-NRWE] 
(noting that Proposition 22 passed with 58% of the vote and discussing the ramifications of the new 
law). 
140. See Kate Conger, It’s a Ballot Fight for Survival for Gig Companies Like Uber, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/23/technology/uber-lyft-california-prop-22.html [ht 
tps://perma.cc/Q2UJ-9DGS] (noting that Uber planned to cut 75% of its drivers if Proposition 22 failed 
to pass); Cal. Proposition 22 (adding Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7449(d), which notes in its findings that 
California’s Assembly Bill 5 threatened to interfere with worker flexibility, and could result in set shifts 
and mandatory hours). 











II. SECOND-GUESSING STATUS 
The questions of whether and how to regulate through status sit on a 
shifting social substrate. These changes strain the ability of statuses to 
regulate effectively. This Part examines how the features of status identified 
in the previous Part can lead to regulatory voids. It illustrates the 
phenomenon through the challenges currently posed by informal 
relationships and gig workers. 
Millions of individuals structure their lives outside the ways the statuses 
of employment and marriage are currently demarcated.  
The rise of globalization and focus on short-term cost reductions in the 
1970s saw an accompanying rise in alternative employment 
arrangements—people employed as independent contractors, on-call 
workers, temporary agency workers, and workers provided by contract 
firms.141 These workers are atypical in the sense that they lack a specific 
employer or any long-term attachment to a firm. 142  The percentage of 
workers in alternative arrangements has remained relatively steady since the 
late 1990s at a little over 10% of the workforce, or 15.5 million people.143  
The growth of alternative employment relationships is only one part of 
the story. Expectations about the employment relationship have also 
changed. Since 1995, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has measured 
“contingent workers,” workers who do not expect their jobs to last.144 By 
some estimates, contingent workers make up 20 to 30% of the workforce.145 
Moreover, job tenure, as well as the percentage of workers who had job 
tenure of more than a decade, has decreased significantly.146 As a result of 
this shifting landscape, even workers with non-contingent jobs are being 
told that they should not expect permanent employment.147  
 
141. See STONE, supra note 3, at 83–86 (interrogating the causes of the breakdown of the 
psychological contract); see also KAREN KOSANOVICH, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., WORKERS IN 
ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS (2018), https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2018/workers-in-
alternative-employment-arrangements/pdf/workers-in-alternative-employment-arrangements.pdf [https 
://perma.cc/M6TW-3BDC] (defining “alternative employment arrangements”). 
142. STONE, supra note 3, at 69. 
143. See KOSANOVICH, supra note 141, at 2 (adding together the four categories of alternative 
arrangements). 
144.  KAREN KOSANOVICH, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., A LOOK AT CONTINGENT WORKERS 2 
(2018), https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2018/contingent-workers/pdf/contingent-workers.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/2ATT-3S7C] (defining “contingent workers” as people who do not expect their jobs to continue 
for personal reasons, such as retirement or returning to school); New Data on Contingent and Alternative 
Employment Examined by BLS, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Aug. 17, 1995), https://www.bls.gov/news 
.release/history/conemp_082595.txt [https://perma.cc/7R8L-QFPY]. 
145. See Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and 
Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 158–59 (2003). 
146. STONE, supra note 3, at 74–83. 












Marriage, too, regulates far fewer familial relationships than it once did. 
In 1967, a little over 70% of adults lived in married households.148 In 2019, 
that figure dropped to just over 51%.149 Approximately 20% of adults have 
never married, and one quarter of adults aged twenty-five to thirty-four may 
never do so.150 During the same period, the number of adults living with a 
nonmarital partner grew from 542,000 to over 18 million, or from less than 
one-half of one percent of households to over seven percent.151 And scholars 
estimate that the number of individuals who live in separate households but 
consider themselves to be in committed intimate relationships exceeds that 
of cohabitants.152 As I have detailed in other work, the 35 million people in 
nonmarital relationships may structure those relationships in different ways: 
for instance, they may or may not be raising children or pooling their 
financial resources. 153  Yet many of these relationships bear significant 
similarities to marriage, both in their expectations for an ongoing 
relationship of mutual support, and because of the way they commingle their 
property and jointly raise children.154 As such, many millions of people in 
marriage-like relationships are unregulated by marriage, or any other laws 
for that matter.155 
We see, then, that the relationships upon which the statuses are 
predicated no longer pertain to significant portions of the population, 
leaving many people without rights and obligations that the law has deemed 
important. Here, I show how the features of status discussed in the previous 
Part lead to corresponding regulatory challenges. 
A. Identity: Identification Challenges 
The reliance on identity becomes problematic when the relevant 
identities are indeterminate. Despite assumptions about the nature of 
employment and marriage, the law has struggled to come up with 
satisfactory tests to identify when relationships should trigger legal 
consequences.  
 
148. Matsumura, supra note 15, at 1016. 
149. See Table AD-3. Living Arrangements of Adults 18 and Over, 1967 to Present, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (Nov. 2019) [hereinafter Table AD-3], https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/fa 
milies/adults.html [https://perma.cc/U48K-T8PF]. 
150. Matsumura, supra note 15, at 1016. 
151. Table AD-3, supra note 149. 
152. Matsumura, supra note 15, at 1016. 
153. See id. at 1029–30. 
154. See id. at 1037. 
155. As I will discuss in Part III, the fact that marriage laws do not cover people in nonmarital 
relationships does not mean that marriage does not influence those people’s legal rights, or lack thereof. 
See infra notes 270–275 and accompanying text. 











In the work law context, the common law test for when someone was an 
employee originated to determine when an employer should be liable in tort 
for the employee’s acts. The touchstone was control: “the control test 
depended on an apparent (though usually unstated) comparison of the 
employer’s supervision or opportunity to supervise on the one hand, and the 
worker’s independence and self-sufficiency on the other.”156  
In the intervening years, some courts have suggested that considerations 
other than control should be paramount to determining whether someone is 
an employee. Judge Learned Hand articulated what has come to be known 
as the “economic realities” test, which focuses on the economic power that 
an employer exerts over its workers, as well as the integration of the workers 
into the employer’s business. 157  This test focuses on the nature of the 
employer’s business and the role the worker plays in that overall business 
practice, with an emphasis on the extent to which the business depends on 
the particular worker.158 Judge Hand also introduced a “statutory purpose” 
approach, under which the concept of employment would depend on the 
goals of the legislation, like the regulation of workplace conditions.159 
Legislation designed to be broadly protective might apply to a broader 
group of workers than respondeat superior liability.  
All these tests are notoriously sprawling. For example, the control test 
articulated by the Supreme Court in several cases consists of a non-
exhaustive list of twelve factors:  
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the 
location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the 
parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional 
projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion 
over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the 
hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is 
part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring 
party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax 
treatment of the hired party.160 
The sheer number of factors and the different possibilities for balancing 
them make it difficult to predict with certainty whether the requisite control 
is present.161 And this is thought to be the predictable test. For example, the 
 
156. Carlson, supra note 2, at 305. 
157. Id. at 312–13.  
158. Id.; Dubal, supra note 10, at 72. 
159. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1914). 
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Supreme Court has criticized the statutory purpose test for being “infected 
with circularity and unable to furnish predictable results.”162  
Although the Court has repeatedly endorsed the control test over these 
other approaches, 163  courts and scholars recognize that all the tests are 
functionally the same.164  That is, none of the different tests are in fact 
capable of resulting in predictable outcomes.165  
Marriage is different because the availability of formalities helps couples 
to identify their relationship. Couples obtain a marriage license and 
participate in a ceremony conducted by an approved officiant to legally 
enter a marriage.166 Court clerks and ministerial officials, rather than judges, 
police these formal requirements.167  
These formalities do little, however, for the millions in informal 
relationships. Common law marriage allows courts to recognize informal 
relationships as legal marriages if the parties hold themselves out as 
married, among other requirements.168 But only a handful of jurisdictions 
still recognize common law marriage, in large part because of the fact-
intensive nature of determining the parties’ intentions.169 
As discussed in the following Section, most states purport to enforce 
agreements between intimate partners regarding property, but when parties 
claim that they agreed to exchange marriage-like performances for 
marriage-like property consequences, 170  they almost always fail. And a 
small handful of states impose marital property laws when the parties have 
lived in a “stable, marital-like relationship,”171 although in that context, as 
well, what it means to be in a marriage-like relationship, or share a life 
together, is challenging to determine.  
 
162. Darden, 503 U.S. at 326. 
163. See id. at 327. 
164. See, e.g., Murray v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 613 F.3d 943, 945 (9th Cir. 2010). 
165. See Befort, supra note 145, at 167; Carlson, supra note 2, at 335; Benjamin Means & Joseph 
A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511, 1531–32 (2016); Blake E. 
Stafford, Riding the Line Between “Employee” and “Independent Contractor” in the Modern Sharing 
Economy, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1223, 1226–34 (2016).  
166. See Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Choosing Marriage, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1999, 2010 
(2017). 
167. See id. at 2011.  
168. See id. at 2019–20; see also Dubler, supra note 47, at 969 (noting that common law marriage 
was an alternative to the threats of illegitimacy and criminal prosecution). 
169. See Stone v. Thompson, 833 S.E.2d 266, 269 (S.C. 2019) (noting, in its decision to abolish 
common law marriage, that “courts struggle mightily to determine if and when parties expressed the 
requisite intent to be married, which is entirely understandable given its subjective and circumstantial 
nature”). 
170. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976) (based on the claim that plaintiff 
would “devote her full time to defendant . . . as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook” in 
exchange for defendant providing “all of plaintiff’s financial support and needs for the rest of her life”). 
171. See, e.g., Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 1995) (en banc). 











In all of these situations, courts find it difficult to get over the fact that 
the partners, however else they arrange their affairs, have not formalized 
their relationship.172 That fact looms large over other “spousely” acts, like 
giving up one’s career, taking over domestic tasks, and even changing one’s 
surname.173 
In sum, identity categories are rarely as straightforward as they seem and 
can struggle to track changing social conditions.  
B. Mandatory Rules: Inadequate Options 
Our legal system has chosen to regulate work and intimate relationships 
through the binary statuses of employment and marriage. To be an employee 
or spouse is to be subject to many rights and obligations; to fall outside those 
statuses is to be subject to almost none of them. A worker for a firm is either 
an employee or an independent contractor. 174  A person in an informal 
relationship is either regulated as single or effectively married.175 This form 
of binary regulation is not an inherent feature of status: in both areas, 
lawmakers could instead provide a menu of options. The current binary 
format, however, stems directly from the mandatory nature of status. 
As discussed above, the status of employee comes with a bundle of rights 
and obligations, none of which attach if the worker is an independent 
contractor. When a worker is an employee, the firm has the right to control 
the worker’s schedule and the manner in which the worker completes her 
tasks. By controlling the worker’s schedule, the firm can effectively limit 
the worker’s ability to work simultaneously for a competitor. In exchange, 
employers must take on responsibilities such as contributing to insurance 
programs such as workers’ compensation, Social Security, and 
 
172. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 643 So. 2d 931, 936 (Miss. 1994) (rejecting a woman’s claim for 
equitable division of the relationship’s assets in large part because the woman had expressly declined to 
formally marry, declaring, “[w]hen opportunity knocks, one must answer its call”). 
173. See, e.g., Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110. 
174. Carlson, supra note 2, at 297; see also Gali Racabi, Despite the Binary: Looking for Power 
Outside the Employee Status, TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 3 & n.2, 11–12) 
(describing the binary view as “canonical” and citing numerous articles that have characterized the law’s 
approach to workers as such) (on file with author). This is not to say that each status is completely 
monolithic. For instance, some employees are exempt from minimum wage and maximum hour 
requirements if, for example, they are “employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or 
professional capacity. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). These and other variations preserve most of the bundle 
of regulations that flow from employment and do not undercut the significance of the 
employee/independent contractor distinction. 












unemployment.176 From a worker’s perspective, employment is a tradeoff 
between these benefits and the corresponding loss of freedom.177  
Gig workers for technology companies such as Uber and Lyft challenge 
this binary paradigm. Workers are not required to do a fixed amount of 
work. In fact, they can work for multiple platforms simultaneously, 
allocating their time and resources based on which platform promises the 
highest compensation.178 Some have full-time jobs and perform gig work on 
the side for extra cash; some do gig work full time between more permanent 
jobs; others solely perform gig work.179 Depending on their work patterns, 
they can look more like independent contractors or employees, a topic 
explored below. The point here is that the law classifies them as one or the 
other: a binary classification system necessarily lacks in subtlety. 
Most efforts at reform only double down on the binary approach. Worker 
advocates have argued that gig workers are not independent contractors but 
employees.180  State legislative proposals all involve making it easier to 
classify gig workers as either employees or independent contractors. 
California, for example, enacted a law expressly intended to make it easier 
to classify gig workers for technology companies181 as employees.182 In 
2019, the states of New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Washington all 
 
176. See Means & Seiner, supra note 165, at 1514; see also Befort, supra note 145, at 162–63. 
177. Befort, supra note 145, at 161 (observing that workers seek out flexible arrangements 
because of job, school, or family obligations). Gali Racabi has observed that despite the law’s binary 
structure, gig workers have been able to leverage tools outside of employment status, like the threat of 
misclassification litigation, informal organizing, and political action, in order to extract some 
concessions from technology companies. See Racabi, supra note 174, at 53–55. Racabi’s work is a 
reminder that laws alone, while consequential, do not fully occupy the field of regulation.  
178. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Don’t Burn the Looms—Regulation of Uber and Other Gig Labor 
Markets, 22 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 51, 73 (2019). 
179. See, e.g., V.B. Dubal, An Uber Ambivalence: Employee Status, Worker Perspectives, & 
Regulation in the Gig Economy 17–18 (U.C. Hastings L., Working Paper No. 381, 2019). 
180. See, e.g., In re Vega, 162 A.D.3d 1337 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018), rev’d, 149 N.E.3d 401 (N.Y. 
2020); Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-573, 2018 WL 1744467 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2018), rev’d, 951 
F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2020).  
181. A product of significant lobbying on behalf of various interest groups, the law includes many 
carve-outs for workers such as “licensed insurance agents, certain licensed health care professionals, 
registered securities broker-dealers or investment advisers, direct sales salespersons, real estate 
licensees, commercial fishermen, workers providing licensed barber or cosmetology services,” and 
more. Assemb. B. 5, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (enacted), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/ 
faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB5 [https://perma.cc/P4YP-JDHV]. 
182. California’s Assembly Bill 5 codified what has come to be known as the “ABC test”: “a 
person providing labor or services for remuneration shall be considered an employee rather than an 
independent contractor unless the hiring entity demonstrates that the person is free from the control and 
direction of the hiring entity in connection with the performance of the work, the person performs work 
that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business, and the person is customarily engaged in 
an independently established trade, occupation, or business.” Id. 











introduced similar laws.183 Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, 
and Texas have all passed rules or legislation intended to make it more 
difficult to classify gig workers as employees.184 All of these responses 
embrace the binary nature of the classification despite significant evidence 
that workers, at least, are ambivalent about the optimality of either status.185 
At first glance, it appears that the law creates several legal options in 
addition to marriage or singleness. 186  Virtually all states have allowed 
nonmarital partners to enter into legally enforceable contracts.187 Several 
other states, like California, Colorado, Hawaii, and Illinois, have created 
domestic partnerships or civil unions and have opened those statuses up to 
all couples. 188  Colorado has gone even further, creating a designated 
beneficiary status that allows partners to select various rights and assign 
them to their designees.189 Finally, a handful of states have adopted a status-
based approach, imposing marital property obligations on relationships that 
bear sufficient similarities to marriage. 190  In practice, however, these 
alternatives to marriage do little to recognize relationships at all, much less 
relationships that fall outside of marriage’s mold.191  
 
183. S. 4204, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2019), https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2018/Bills/S4500/4 
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Extraordinary Sess. (Tenn. 2018), http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/Billinfo/default.aspx?BillNumber=H 
B1978&ga=110 [https://perma.cc/9G6L-RG93]; H. 221, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017), https://www 
.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2017/0221 [https://perma.cc/MC49-L6ZT]; H. 2652, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. 
(Ariz. 2016), https://www.azleg.gov/legtext/52leg/2r/bills/hb2652h.pdf [https://perma.cc/3S44-SCH 
W]; 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 815.134 (2019). 
185. Dubal, supra note 179, at 4 (noting several significant surveys suggesting a worker 
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Although most states will purportedly enforce agreements between 
cohabitants not resting on sexual consideration, contract has not made much 
of an impact in the nonmarital space. In the first place, the number of 
contract claims that are brought is infinitesimal compared to the number of 
informal relationships that end. Moreover, when a partner brings a contract 
claim premised on the exchange of marriage-like performances for 
marriage-like property consequences, effectively seeking retroactively to 
recognize the relationship as a marriage, these claims almost never succeed, 
not even when they are part of express agreements.192  
Domestic partner and civil union statuses offer a technical alternative to 
marriage, but are modeled on legal marriage such that they are essentially 
marriage by another name. 193  Perhaps confirming this characterization, 
these alternate statuses have experienced a significant decline in popularity 
once same-sex couples were allowed to marry.194 Status-based approaches 
have proved to be a useful tool for the jurisdictions that recognize them, but 
they too require that the parties cohabit in a “stable, marital-like 
relationship.”195  
For nonmarital relationships to be recognized, which is rare, they must 
be essentially marital, regardless of what they are called. Thus, two basic 
options remain: marriage and singleness.196 
The consequence of this binary approach to regulation is that the diverse, 
highly textured landscapes of work or nonmarital relationships must reduce 
to two options. This situation not only creates the possibility of sharp 
distinctions between the favored and disfavored statuses, but can mean that 
a status is defined by a wide array of conduct, potentially diluting the 
meaning of the status itself. 
 
192. Antognini, supra note 21; see also Courtney G. Joslin, Untitled 28–31 (Sept. 3, 2020) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (showing that claims based on a theory of family 
partnership fail). Partners have had a bit more success bringing claims based on discrete financial 
contributions within the context of an intimate relationship, although the number of these cases is still 
small. See id. 
193. See Culhane, supra note 189, at 150; cf. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (2007) (stating that 
domestic partners will have the same rights and obligations as married spouses). 
194. See Matsumura, supra note 15, at 1018. Although Colorado’s designated beneficiary status 
deviates from this approach and opens the possibility that the state will recognize relationships for vastly 
different purposes, few have opted in. See Culhane, supra note 189, at 149–50. 
195. Connell, 898 P.2d at 834 (emphasis added). 
196. Halley, supra note 5, at 31. As I will discuss in Part III, infra, the law’s conception of 
singleness is not exactly the same thing as being in an arm’s length relationship. “Single” people do not 
qualify for the legal benefits reserved for married people, but they also cannot contract with intimate 
partners in the same way that they would with strangers. See infra notes 273–275, and accompanying 
text. 











C. Bundling: Heightened Stakes 
The consequences of the binary approach to regulation are heightened 
by the sheer number of legal rights tied to employment and marital status.197 
The conclusion that a person is an employee or a spouse changes that person 
in the eyes of the State and third parties and imposes serious consequences 
on the other party to the relationship.  
Many consequences flow from the conclusion that a worker is an 
employee. Because these consequences are established by different state 
and federal laws, it is possible that a single work relationship could give rise 
to different conclusions about whether someone is an employee. 198 
However, despite (or perhaps due to) the failure of Congress and state 
legislatures to define “employee” with particularity in the various statutes 
in which the term appears, courts have converged on relatively overlapping 
tests to determine whether someone is an employee.199 The Supreme Court 
has applied the common law control test to federal statutes like the Taft-
Hartley Act, Social Security Act, Copyright Act, ERISA, Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. 200  Where the factors differ, the fact-
specific nature of the inquiry makes it impossible to determine whether 
minor differences in legal tests produce different outcomes, and most 
scholars assume they do not.201  
And even in the face of these different tests, courts presume that 
employers will make a single classification decision and, on that basis, pay 
“federal Social Security and payroll taxes, unemployment insurance taxes 
and state employment taxes, provid[e] worker’s compensation insurance, 
and . . . comply[] with numerous state and federal statutes and regulations 
governing the wages, hours, and working conditions of employees.”202 In 
short, the concept of employment is relatively stable across different 
contexts.203 
 
197. Cf. Halley, supra note 5, at 33 (noting that steep drop-offs between marriage and singleness 
make marriage more status-like). 
198. See Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 
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expansively than others). 
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200. Carlson, supra note 2, at 324–25; Bodie, supra note 199, at 677–80. 
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203. See Bodie, supra note 199, at 662. But see Dubal, supra note 10, at 76 (noting one instance 












Indeed, the whole notion of “misclassification” suggests that 
employment is a fixed and knowable category. Congress has chastised the 
courts and the National Labor Relations Board for complicating the inquiry 
beyond common understandings, presupposing that such understandings 
exist. 204  Reflecting similar assumptions, the California legislature has 
accused technology companies of “unfair[ly]” depriving workers of “basic 
rights and protections they deserve,”205 as if the concept of employment is 
beyond contestation.  
Like the work law context, marriage bundles together a set of legal 
incidents that flow from the status determination. Each state, as well as the 
federal government, has the authority to regulate and define marriage in its 
own way. Many federal laws turn on marital status as defined by the state 
in which the marriage is solemnized, providing a significant degree of 
consistency. For example, the Internal Revenue Service has expressly 
incorporated state definitions of marriage when interpreting the Internal 
Revenue Code. 206  But some federal laws do not incorporate state 
definitions, adding additional requirements to prove the existence of a valid 
marriage (as in the immigration context),207 or treating couples as married 
even in the absence of any legal marriage under state law (as in the 
supplemental security income benefits context).208 And differences between 
eligibility requirements between states mean that some marriages may be 
recognized in some states but not others.209  
That said, it is generally true that the act of legally marrying will subject 
a couple to a whole host of legal obligations, and that couples generally 
understand that this different set of legal rules applies to them, even if they 
are unaware of how those specific laws work. 210  Moreover, through a 
combination of choice of law rules, the federalization of various aspects of 
marriage, and constitutional holdings preventing discrimination in how the 
right to marry is defined, the definition of marriage is generally consistent 
across jurisdictions.211 
 
204. Carlson, supra note 2, at 321. 
205. Assemb. B. 5, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2019) (enacted) (emphasis added), https:/ 
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206. Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60, 1958 WL 10653. 
207. See Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (2012). 
208. Matsumura, supra note 166, at 2022. 
209. Matsumura, supra note 29. Both interracial marriage and same-sex marriages were 
inconsistently recognized by states. Id. at 492–93. First cousin marriages are allowed in some states but 
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210. See id. at 468. 
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With few exceptions, courts and lawmakers in both the marriage and 
employment contexts presume that those statuses are singular things, and 
that the various legal consequences naturally flow from those statuses. The 
fact that so many laws turn on the statuses makes the consequences of an 
erroneous determination more severe.212 
D. Hierarchy: Status Arbitrage 
Given that statuses reward, incentivize, burden, or deter,213 parties will 
inevitably have incentives—often conflicting—to claim one status or the 
other. 214  Most obviously, the more economically powerful party may 
attempt to evade the support obligations that flow from the status.215 Where 
status impacts eligibility for valuable government-provided benefits, parties 
may also have incentives to manipulate their identities to claim those 
benefits. 216  Policymakers have understandably attempted to respond to 
instances of status arbitrage. It is not always possible, however, to 
generalize about a party’s motives, much less the motives of an entire class 
of actors. Attempts to prevent status arbitrage risk simplifying or ignoring 
the incentives of one or both parties in the relationship.  
In the work law context, courts and scholars have observed that 
employers will often have significant financial incentives to classify 
workers as independent contractors rather than employees. Financial 
contributions to workers and the state and federal governments based on 
employment status can be substantial. The California Supreme Court 
pointed out that employers that misclassify their workers gain an “unfair 
competitive advantage” over compliant competitors; they also avoid 
making billions of dollars of payments to the federal and state 
governments.217  
Although firms may intentionally mischaracterize workers in order to 
reap these unfair competitive advantages, there are non-pernicious reasons 
for firms to avoid hiring people as employees. As David Weil has shown, 
describing a phenomenon he has labeled the “fissured workplace,” 
 
212. See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Matsumura, supra 
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213. See supra Part I.A. 
214. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010) (defining 
“regulatory arbitrage” as the act of “exploit[ing] the gap between the economic substance of a transaction 
and its legal or regulatory treatment, taking advantage of the legal system’s intrinsically limited ability 
to attach formal labels that track the economics of transactions with sufficient precision”). 
215. See Bagchi, supra note 107, at 583 (arguing for the use of “status based” reforms to address 
unequal bargaining power). 
216. See generally Abrams, supra note 207, at 6. 
217. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 5 (Cal. 2018); see also Carlson, 












businesses have faced increasing pressure to reduce costs and focus on core 
competencies.218 Technological developments have reduced coordination 
costs, making it possible to outsource non-essential tasks to 
intermediaries.219 For example, it may now be cheaper and more efficient 
for hotels to hire housekeepers through third-party agencies rather than to 
employ those housekeepers in-house.220 Weil concludes that “[w]orkplace 
fissuring arises as a consequence of the integration of three distinct strategic 
elements, the first one focused on revenues (a laser-like focus on core 
competency), the second focused on costs (shedding employment), and the 
final one providing the glue to make the overall strategy operate effectively 
. . . .”221 Although gig economy workers often work directly for technology 
companies and not for intermediaries, Weil’s analysis reminds us that the 
decision not to hire workers as employees can arise in a variety of contexts 
and for a variety of reasons.  
Workers, too, have complicated preferences and motivations. Several 
studies of Uber drivers have found that a majority of Uber drivers prefer to 
be classified as independent contractors rather than employees.222 Although 
these studies report worker preferences in terms of a binary choice, a recent 
survey study by V.B. Dubal reminds us that the preference for independent 
contractor status reflects ambivalence about the options: many drivers who 
expressed a preference for independent contractor status would welcome the 
benefits that flow from being an employee but were afraid about how 
employee status might affect their job flexibility, which they valued more.223 
In other words, if the current status categories were reoriented, worker 
preferences might change. Yet the binary and bundled classification regime 
smooths over those complexities. 
The proposals to regulate nonmarital relationships similarly respond to 
concerns about misaligned incentives. The American Law Institute’s 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution (“ALI Principles”) would 
presumptively impose marital property rules on cohabiting relationships 
over a certain duration to curb the wealthier partner’s incentive to avoid 
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429 (2019). These studies have received criticism for presenting compound options to workers and then 
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marriage’s financial consequences.224 Supporters note that courts typically 
disregard or discount the value of domestic contributions to a nonmarital 
relationship, enriching the more economically powerful partner at the 
other’s expense.225 Additionally, they argue that incentives break down on 
gender lines, with men being much more reluctant to marry, putting women 
at their mercy.226 
Some relationships track this pattern.227 However, relationships between 
wealthy men and stay-at-home women are increasingly uncommon for 
several reasons. First, women are earning more compared to their partners 
than was the case decades ago.228 Second, people are increasingly likely to 
partner with people who have comparable levels of education and wealth, a 
phenomenon some call assortative mating.229 People who marry are more 
likely to be highly educated and well off, whereas people who cohabit are 
more likely to have lower levels of education and wealth.230 Many within 
this latter cohort are less likely to commit to each other and commingle their 
assets because of a lack of trust; they fear the negative consequences of 
linking their financial future to someone unreliable.231 Notably, many of the 
people expressing this hesitancy are women.232 Sociologists Kathryn Edin 
and Maria Kefalas suggest that the “domestic abuse, chronic infidelity, 
alcoholism or drug addiction, repeated incarceration, or a living made from 
crime” that characterizes many lower-income cohabiting relationships 
renders the reluctance to marry “quite reasonable.”233 In short, the desire to 
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avoid financial obligations may stem not from a powerful party’s desire to 
exploit a vulnerable one, but from a mix of different motives.  
The hierarchical nature of status regulation provides incentives to enter 
into or avoid employment and marriage. Power differentials, however, 
manifest in shades of gray rather than black and white, affected by the whole 
bundle of rights and obligations, some of which may operate at cross-
purposes. Anything less than a full accounting of these incentives may result 
in reforms that miss the mark. 
 
* * * 
 
This Part has shown how features of status create regulatory challenges, 
ultimately resulting in a mismatch between established statuses and realities 
on the ground. Proposals to address just one problem are likely to divert 
uncertainty to the others.234 Merely simplifying the common law test for 
employment classification, for example, would not alter the parties’ 
incentives to claim one status or another; it would just prompt 
workarounds.235 This suggests that successfully addressing the underlying 
problem of providing workers and nonmarital partners with the appropriate 
legal benefits and obligations requires a systemic approach.  
III. ESCAPING STATUS 
Considering the shortcomings of status discussed above, one might ask 
whether it makes sense to continue regulating relationships through status.  
As Cynthia Estlund has observed, “[t]here is a certain irony in the almost-
romantic attachment of some contemporary worker advocates to the 
standard employment relationship, with its signature features of worker 
dependency and managerial domination.”236  Indeed, history teaches that 
statuses inevitably produce hierarchies, both within status relationships 
themselves and between identity groups. Despite modernization, for 
instance, “wifely” work is still discounted regardless of the sex of the person 
performing it, 237  and women continue to perform a disproportionate 
 
234. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 
77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999) (noting that in a hydraulic system, understanding why the water (or 
political money) “flows where it does and what functions it serves when it gets there requires thinking 
about the system as a whole”). 
235. See Michelle Cheng, Independent Contractors Are Already Finding Ways to Work Around 
AB5, QUARTZ (Jan. 30, 2020), https://qz.com/1793028/california-workers-are-setting-up-more-llcs-afte 
r-ab5/ [https://perma.cc/G475-A7TZ] (describing how some California workers are incorporating as 
LLCs to strengthen their status as independent contractors). 
236. Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and Employment Law, 128 
YALE L.J. 254, 325 (2018). 
237. Antognini, supra note 225, at 2145. 











share. 238  The privileging of marriage over other forms of intimate 
relationships promotes further inequality. Given the perpetuation of 
hierarchies through status, what, then, explains advocates’ persistent pursuit 
of benefits through employment239 or relationships240 rather than some other 
way? 
A practical answer is that the strategic goals of enough stakeholders—
whether scholars, advocates, lobbyists, lawmakers, or the affected 
individuals themselves—weigh in favor of status. Given their interest in 
privatizing dependency, state legislators may align themselves with 
workers’ rights advocates, who may be agnostic (or realistic) about where 
increased benefits come from. Some conservatives allied themselves with 
same-sex marriage advocates to preserve the popularity of marriage and 
build consensus around the status, rather than watching marriage steadily 
decline.241 
There is an even more fundamental reason why status-based regulation 
persists, however: there is really no other realistic option. Status is 
inevitable. 
The law depends on categories to create meaning. Our system is based 
on generally applicable laws that apply across the board to particular types 
of conduct or particular classes of people.242 Laws that single out individuals 
for punishment, for example, are constitutionally prohibited;243 civil laws 
that accomplish the same result are similarly disfavored.244  
Moreover, statuses simplify the imposition of legal consequences. It 
would be impracticable to administer programs like Social Security, 
determine rates of taxation, or determine standing to sue for relationship-
 
238. See Katherine Schaeffer, Among U.S. Couples, Women Do More Cooking and Grocery 
Shopping than Men, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/09/ 
24/among-u-s-couples-women-do-more-cooking-and-grocery-shopping-than-men/ [https://perma.cc/H 
GD3-4J7M]. 
239. See, e.g., Turning “Gig” Jobs into Good Jobs, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, https://www.nelp.or 
g/campaign/turning-gig-jobs-into-good-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/LJ8S-WN7Q] (pursuing employment 
status to provide a “decent income[], an adequate safety net, and basic rights”). 
240. See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 224, § 6.02 cmt. b (requiring partners to “assume some 
economic responsibility” for the circumstances in which cohabitants find themselves). 
241. See, e.g., David Blankenhorn, How My View on Gay Marriage Changed, N.Y. TIMES (June 
22, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/how-my-view-on-gay-marriage-changed.htm 
l (expressing the desire to “build new coalitions” to “strengthen marriage”); Theodore B. Olson, The 
Conservative Case for Gay Marriage, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 8, 2010), https://www.newsweek.com/conserva 
tive-case-gay-marriage-70923 [https://perma.cc/L84D-9RYS] (noting the shared “conservative” goals 
of “strong families” and “lasting domestic relationships”). 
242. See Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 656–58 (2014) 
(noting the jurisprudential foundations for a theory of legislative generality). 
243. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9–10 (Bill of Attainder clauses). 
244. See Zoldan, supra note 242, at 650–60. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City 
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531, 533 (1993). But see Zoldan, supra note 242, at 632–40 (noting that in 












based torts on an individual basis.245 Statuses provide conceptual categories 
that sort individuals and identify the rights that attach by virtue of their 
membership in the relevant identity category. 246  Reliance on these 
categories is far more efficient than idiosyncratic individualized 
determinations.247 
Although some rights that fall within status bundles can—and should—
be broken off and distributed on some other basis, that will not, practically 
speaking, circumvent status-based regulation. Imagine, for example, that 
health insurance were provided by the state instead of private employers.248 
Or that the state provided a whole range of services designed to assist 
families,249 even up to a universal basic income.250 Those benefits would 
still have to be distributed on some basis, whether citizenship, residency, or 
some other way. 251  A reform like universal health care still begs the 
question, “universal to whom?” The answer is an existing status (like 
citizenship) or a new status, which will in turn become the site of 
contestation.252  
Status-based regulation is made all the more inevitable because of the 
status-izing of contract. Each of the features of status—identity-based, 
 
245. See, e.g., Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 587 (Cal. 1988) (noting the “necessity of providing 
an institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons in 
organized society,” as well as the “difficult burden on the courts” of opening up individualized inquiries). 
246. As Paul Miller puts it, “[s]tatuses simplify semantically by giving us a provisional conceptual 
characterization of the normative position held by a person, . . . thereby relieving us of the burden of 
fully articulating . . . our conceptualization of that position in each and every case . . . . [S]tatuses simplify 
(narrow) practical reasoning, inviting those who rely upon them to bypass questions concerning the 
characterization of the normative position of the person . . . in favor of questions relating to the normative 
consequences of occupation of that position in a particular case.” Miller, supra note 24, at 35. 
247. See id. at 36–37. 
248. See, e.g., June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 963, 1024 
(2017) (arguing that that if individuals and the state, rather than employers, were responsible for 
providing health insurance, workers would be less dependent on their employers and better equipped to 
move between jobs, as well as less vulnerable during periods of unemployment); Naomi Cahn & June 
Carbone, Uncoupling, 53 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 48–54) (arguing in favor of 
de-linking various forms of government support from marriage and employment) (on file with author). 
249. See, e.g., MAXINE EICHNER, THE FREE-MARKET FAMILY: HOW THE MARKET CRUSHED THE 
AMERICAN DREAM (AND HOW IT CAN BE RESTORED) (2019). 
250. See, e.g., GUY STANDING, BASIC INCOME: A GUIDE FOR THE OPEN-MINDED (2017). 
251. Compare Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel Hemel, The Architecture of a Basic Income, 87 
U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 671–79 (2020) (analyzing potential eligibility determinants such as age, work 
status, and immigration status, and concluding that universal basic income should be made available 
without respect to age and to citizens and legal permanent residents, but not other immigrants), with 
William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1890 (2001) (assuming that universal basic income, if ever implemented, 
would be distributed to citizens). 
252. Another well-known example from the family law context is Martha Fineman’s proposal to 
“abolish marriage as a legal category” and replace it with the mother-child relationship, which would 
“be the base entity around which social policy and legal rules are fashioned.” MARTHA ALBERTSON 
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY 
TRAGEDIES 5–6 (1995). The relevant status would be “Mother/Child,” with motherhood qualifying a 
person for “privacy (without paternity), subsidy (without strings), space (to make mistakes).” Id. at 233. 











bundled, mandatory rules that reflect and reinforce social hierarchies—are 
part of modern contract doctrine.  
If there was ever a moment in which relationships did not “deform”253 
classical contract doctrine, it was brief and has certainly passed. Classical 
contract doctrine is premised on the belief in a set of neutral principles that 
are “blind to details of subject matter and person.”254 A contract is nothing 
more than the product of the will of these depersonalized parties. 255 
“Contract law describes itself as more private than public, interpretation as 
more about objective than subjective understanding, consideration as more 
about form than about substance.”256 The emergence of contract law as a 
unification of principles governing negotiable instruments, sales, insurance, 
and more under the umbrella of “contract” was a nineteenth century 
invention257  designed to express the ideology of the nineteenth century 
market economy.258  
Numerous scholars have shown that the formalistic view of contract law 
as abstract and depersonalized has always been largely fictional. The 
identity of the contracting parties has always mattered. Morton Horwitz has 
shown, for example, that nineteenth century courts treated labor contracts 
differently from building contracts when it came to breaches of agreements 
to work for a fixed period of time.259 Likewise, longstanding concepts like 
promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment focus on the conduct of the 
parties within the context of their relationship and provide legal relief 
beyond what the parties may have objectively willed.260 
Indeed, virtually every aspect of contract doctrine expresses normative 
views about the law’s proper purposes and the ways in which parties should 
interact within a given relationship. 261  Defenses like public policy and 
 
253. Franklin G. Snyder, The Pernicious Effect of Employment Relationships on the Law of 
Contracts, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 33, 36 (2003). 
254. GILMORE, supra note 23, at 7 (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN 
AMERICA 20–24 (1965)). 
255. See Snyder, supra note 253, at 41. 
256. Dalton, supra note 19, at 1000. 
257. See GILMORE, supra note 23, at 12 (noting that the law of “contracts” emerged after laws 
governing specialties such as negotiable instruments, sales, insurance, and more already came into 
existence); see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 160 
(1992) (“Modern contract law is fundamentally a creature of the nineteenth century.”); Snyder, supra 
note 253, at 39–40 (noting the origin of contract law in a “series of various kinds of transactions and 
different remedies”). 
258. HORWITZ, supra note 257, at 185. 
259. Id. at 186–87. 
260. See GILMORE, supra note 23, at 62–80; see also Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 
HARV. L. REV. 553, 578–79 (1933) (noting that promissory estoppel is “social,” based on what 
reasonable people would do under the circumstances, and akin to “other civil wrongs or torts”). 
261. See Cohen, supra note 260, at 587 (“[W]e also need care that the power of the state be not 













unconscionability obviously express the law’s (or at least a particular 
judge’s) normative views about the subject matter of the contract or the 
reasonableness of the terms of the agreement or the parties’ conduct.262 The 
decision not to enforce a particular agreement based on its substance 
effectively transfers an entitlement from one party to the other, affecting the 
parties’ rights.263 Even the act of interpretation cannot be divorced from the 
context in which the agreement arose. The whole purpose of the parol 
evidence rule, for instance, is to determine when a written agreement is final 
and impervious to supplementation or interpretation through extrinsic 
evidence.264 But the finality of the agreement is rarely assessed in a vacuum 
and often considers the parties’ dealings and trade usage.265 
In the realm of contract, then, the law is imposing substantive limits on 
the parties’ commitments and conduct, enforcing norms embedded within 
the types of relationships at issue, and subverting the will of the parties to 
the preferences of the decision-makers.266 In effect, contract law, just like 
status, imposes a package of duties and obligations that can extend to both 
the subject matter of the parties’ exchange, as well as the ways in which the 
parties are obliged to interact. 
We see the impact of relationships in the contexts of employment and 
nonmarriage. Courts have adopted default rules based on the perceived 
disparities in bargaining power between workers and employers, for 
instance, by construing ambiguous terms against employers267 or varying 
the usual rules regarding specific performance. 268  The pervasiveness of 
unconventional contract outcomes in employment cases has led one scholar 
to bemoan work law’s “unfortunate effects on contract doctrine.”269 
To see contract doctrine slide into status, one need look no further than 
nonmarital relationships. Courts have frequently refused to enforce 
agreements between intimates based on the subject matter of the agreement, 
 
262. See Russell, supra note 18, at 971–72 (unconscionability); Matsumura, supra note 18, at 163 
(public policy). 
263. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1114 (1972) (noting that 
“[p]rohibiting the sale of babies makes poorer those who can cheaply produce babies and richer those 
who through some nonmarket device get free an ‘unwanted’ baby”).  
264. See Dalton, supra note 19, at 1048–49. 
265. Id. at 1049. Even if the court were to refuse to look at extrinsic evidence to determine whether 
the parties intended the agreement to be final, the court would have to rely on some other means—
whether experience or intuition—to come to her conclusion; that experience or intuition would be based 
on the judge’s own education, upbringing, and other personal circumstances. 
266. Gregg Strauss has analyzed the use of these types of relational norms to inform the 
application of tort and contract doctrines to conclude that some form of status-based regulation of 
intimate relationships is unavoidable. See Strauss, supra note 67, at 1288–99. 
267. See Bagchi, supra note 107, at 584 & n.13. 
268. See Snyder, supra note 253, at 34 & n.11. 
269. Id. at 35. 











like promises to exchange domestic support for money, or to engage in or 
refrain from sexual conduct. 270  In a recent article, Albertina Antognini 
shows that although most jurisdictions claim to enforce agreements between 
cohabitants, courts frequently refuse to enforce even express agreements 
exchanging property for domestic services. 271  But they will enforce 
agreements when they involve the pooling of financial resources, like 
jointly running a business or purchasing real property.272  
To state the obvious, people in arms’ length relationships are welcome 
to contract for things like taking care of children, cooking, or cleaning the 
house; hence the existence of babysitters, nannies, and housekeepers. The 
fact that these same services are inalienable within the context of a 
cohabiting relationship shows that status is masquerading as contract. Non-
enforcement transfers value from one party to the other. By refusing to 
enforce an exchange of domestic services for money, the law enables the 
wealthy party to get services from the other party for free.273  
If one is in a cohabiting relationship, one can pursue joint financial 
projects, but cannot exchange money for domestic labor. Unlike strangers 
or spouses, partners who provide domestic services do so for free. These 
disabling impacts apply in combination with the lack of access to the default 
legal protections that spouses enjoy. As discussed above, in most 
jurisdictions, partners lack access to default property distribution, 
inheritance rules, and standing to sue based on injuries suffered by the other. 
They also lack access to federal benefits premised on marriage, like Social 
Security survivor’s benefits,274 although the same relationship may render 
them ineligible for Supplemental Security Income administered by the same 
agency.275 
The totality of these consequences is a bundle of regulation—a status of 
“singleness”—that stems from the salient feature of the parties as unmarried 
cohabitants. Numerous scholars have shown that contract doctrine bears 
little resemblance to the narrow, abstract, and depersonalized conception 
with which it is often identified. These examples go further. They show that, 
with respect to relationships that society values, contract doctrine as 
currently constituted is status-like. 
 
270. See Matsumura, supra note 18, at 190–95; Silbaugh, supra note 41, at 78. 
271. See Antognini, supra note 21, at 10–11. 
272. See id. at 12. 
273. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 263, at 1099 (noting the importance of where the law 
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274. See Liu, supra note 132, at 11–12. 
275. See Dutko v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-10698, 2015 WL 6750792 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 5, 2015) 
(treating a cohabiting couple as married under Social Security Administration guidelines in order to 












That some form of status regulation is inescapable does not mean that 
status systems are neutral with respect to values like autonomy and 
egalitarianism. Statuses can be broken down and reconstituted to better 
serve those values. Tailoring statuses to the needs and preferences of a 
greater percentage of the population would enhance autonomy, as would 
introducing a plurality of statuses to reflect a greater diversity of 
preferences.276 A menu of options could moderate the disparities stemming 
from the current binary approaches, putting more people on comparable—
or comparably different—legal footing. In so doing, a plural approach could 
also disrupt social meanings that favor some groups over others.  
Reorienting legal rights around a status like citizenship rather than 
marriage or employment could have different salutary effects. As many 
have observed, citizenship does not practically guarantee equal enjoyment 
of legal privileges or equal distribution of the law’s burdens. 277  Yet 
aspirationally, at least, citizenship connotes equal treatment and full 
membership in society.278 It is therefore a powerful foundation from which 
to argue, as Kenneth Karst has, that “organized society treat each individual 
as a person, one who is worthy of respect,” or, “[s]tated negatively,” that 
organized society may not “treat an individual either as a member of an 
inferior or dependent caste or as a nonparticipant.”279  
Shifting legal rights from the statuses of marriage and employment to 
something broader like citizenship would simultaneously ensure greater 
access to valued benefits and emphasize the importance of belonging at the 
national level. Significant dependency would be transferred from private 
parties to the state, reducing disparities between those parties. Allowing 
more people to fully participate in society would also foster a sense of 
national community. 280  As discussed above, citizenship has its own 
administrative and conceptual limits. The presence of undocumented 
minors, temporary workers, and others has tested the appropriateness of 
relying on citizenship as a defining characteristic. 281  Indeed, the very 
 
276. See infra Part IV.B. 
277. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 
1–7 & passim (1988) (noting the nation’s long struggle to abolish racial inequality and achieve equal 
citizenship); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 19–33 (1969) (examining how the experience of poverty deprives 
citizens of access to various valued rights). 
278. See Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1977). 
279. Id. at 6. 
280. See id. at 9 (arguing that “the opportunity to participate promotes the ‘sense of wholeness’ 
that must be maintained if America’s ‘segmented society’ is to function”).  
281. As Hiroshi Motomura has observed, the question of “who belongs enough [in this country] 
to assert civil rights” has a long history. Motomura, supra note 90, at 476; see also LINDA BOSNIAK, 
THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 3 (2008) (“The experiences 
 











concept of civil rights is predicated on borders: the ability to identify an “in” 
group to whom rights should flow.282  
These difficult questions, however, merely illustrate the extent to which 
social hierarchies depend upon the ways legal statuses are constituted. That 
overarching question is the focus of the next Part. 
IV. REFORMING STATUS 
If social patterns and norms inevitably shift over time, then status, as a 
bundle of regulation stemming from a fixed identity, will eventually require 
reform.283 The very features of status that undermine its operation point to 
related institutional design questions. We can ask whether to pursue a 
pluralistic approach instead of a binary one; to disaggregate legal incidents 
or keep them bound up in the relevant statuses; and how to police the 
boundaries of the status, for instance, by abandoning ex post, fact-intensive 
analyses for ex ante formalities, or making it easier to transition between 
statuses thereby mitigating the harsh consequences of leaving one status for 
another. Importantly, regulatory reforms must ask all of these questions 
simultaneously.  
A. What’s in the Bundle? 
As discussed in Part I, one of the characteristics of status is that it makes 
multiple legal rules turn on a single identity. An important institutional 
design question is how legal incidents should be bound up in a status or 
disaggregated. Lawmakers have constantly appended additional rights onto 
 
of being a citizen and enjoying citizenship, it turns out, are not always aligned as a practical matter; 
status noncitizens are the subjects of what many call citizenship in a variety of contexts.”). Jennifer 
Chacón and her collaborators have shown that citizenship-adjacent statuses such as Temporary Protected 
Status and DACA ultimately test understandings of what it means to be a citizen while simultaneously 
revealing the tenuousness of formal legal citizenship itself. See Jennifer M. Chacón et al., Citizenship 
Matters: Conceptualizing Belonging in an Era of Fragile Inclusions, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 13–22, 
39–41, 54–66 (2018). Chacón notes that the “statist, territorial, rights-based, bounded and dialectic” 
understanding of citizenship has been contested, and that it might be more accurate to understand 
citizenship as “an iterative product of reciprocal exchange between ‘citizen’ and ‘state’ in which 
contextual notions of rights and obligations emerge discursively . . . .” Id. at 76.  
282. Motomura notes that the purpose of national borders is “to divide ‘us’ from ‘them.’” Id. at 
472. The concept of civil rights depends upon identifying the relevant community entitled to those rights, 
a task to which borders are central. See id. at 471–74; see also BOSNIAK, supra note 281, at 1 (“The idea 
of citizenship is commonly invoked to convey a state of democratic belonging or inclusion, yet this 
inclusion is usually premised on a conception of a community that is bounded and exclusive.”). A human 
rights framework, in contrast to civil rights, “cast[s] doubt on the centrality of state sovereignty” but is 
so broad that it has gained little traction. Motomura, supra note 90, at 473–74. 
283. Looking beyond marriage and employment, Linda McClain has observed, for example, that 
the social understanding of parentage has shifted from primarily marital, to one that is increasingly 












the frameworks of marriage and employment, making those statuses more 
consequential.284 They could theoretically do the opposite.  
An initial consideration is whether the status has inherent legal content. 
I am unaware of any scholars who argue that employment has a pre-political 
or inherent meaning. The same is not true for marriage, however. Some have 
argued that marriage is a permanent union of a man and a woman that is 
fulfilled through the bearing and rearing of children.285 They ground this 
definition in religion or natural law and view the law as a reflection of these 
pre-legal meanings.286 Those who believe that certain features of marriage 
law are divinely mandated or “natural” will oppose disaggregation, at least 
as to those features. At the moment, there is no support for this position on 
the Court,287 although that could always change. 
Assuming the substance of a status is not preordained, one important 
consideration when thinking about what rights should flow from a status is 
that those rights can make the status attractive to individuals, thereby 
inducing people to enter it.288 Changes to the positive law of the status can 
affect its importance to individuals.289 The more widespread the status, the 
more effective it will be at promoting socially desirable behavior.290 Of 
course, some would advocate in favor of disaggregating status for the 
express purpose of diminishing its authority, which, in their view, would 
disrupt built-in hierarchies.291 
Beyond the desire to promote or undercut the statuses themselves, 
aggregation and disaggregation are also tools to refine the ability of a status 
 
284. See supra Parts I.B and II.C. 
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(contending that natural law is connected to human dignity, specifically, “the quite literally awe-
inspiring power to be an uncaused causing”). 
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288. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) (reasoning that marriage laws 
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by Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644; Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 54 (1977) (recognizing that laws regulating 
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289. See Abrams, supra note 207, at 66 (arguing that the disaggregation of rights from marriage 
would change incentives to marry and might mitigate the unequal impact on individuals who cannot 
marry). 
290. Cf. Schneider, supra note 110, at 498. 
291. See NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE 90 (2008) (advocating 
that we “knock marriage off its perch”); id. at 151 (wanting to “mak[e] marriage matter less”); see also 
ELIZABETH BRAKE, MINIMIZING MARRIAGE: MARRIAGE, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 5 (2012) 
(providing a comprehensive critique of the inequities of marriage and advocating for “minimal 
marriage”). 











to accurately impose legal consequences.292 Marriage and employment do 
not always regulate coherently. Several influential scholars have argued, for 
example, that marriage is a poor proxy for benefit eligibility because it can 
be overinclusive or underinclusive: it doesn’t prevent people from getting 
married for instrumental purposes, and it also fails to deliver benefits to 
people whose relationships justify those benefits. 293  If the purpose of 
subsidizing time off from full-time work is to provide caregiving, marriage 
is not the best way to determine who qualifies because of the number of 
people providing caregiving outside of marriage.294 Richard Carlson has 
taken the argument a step further in the work law context. He has proposed 
“an approach to statutory coverage based on the character of the transactions 
between the parties instead of the status of the parties.” 295  Each legal 
consequence would depend on the nature of the work relationship at issue, 
rather than the status of the worker.296 Carlson’s approach would completely 
unravel employment status in favor of individualized, functionalist 
determinations.297  
Although these arguments for functional disaggregation are compelling, 
these proposals tend not to consider the impact of disaggregation on the 
coherence of statuses. The enactment or elimination of any given marriage 
law can undermine a function that marriage promotes: the expansion of no-
fault divorce, for example, challenged the understanding of marriage as a 
 
292. Lee Anne Fennell has observed that “law can make it easier or harder to slice up unified 
things or assemble fragmented things.” LEE ANNE FENNELL, SLICES AND LUMPS: DIVISION AND 
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all of which are best served by including marital relationships to the exclusion of others); Abrams, supra 
note 207, at 54–55. Linda McClain has argued that the thought experiment of disaggregating the benefits 
of marriage and assigning them to relationships based on function would not only help to answer whether 
and how to regulate nonmarital relationships, but would also clarify whether the government should be 
relying on relationships as the fulcrum of regulation in the first instance. See LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE 
PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 201–02 (2006) (also 
noting that the task would “be quite burdensome and time-consuming”). 
294. See Abrams, supra note 207, at 56–57. Other family law scholars have proposed 
disaggregating benefits from marriage and assigning them based on the functions they perform, based 
on the same desire to more accurately provide rights to those who deserve them. See POLIKOFF, supra 
note 291, at 123–31; Blumberg, supra note 127, at 1140 (analyzing laws governing “workers’ 
compensation, social security, . . . spousal support . . . , public assistance, and income taxation” to see 
whether cohabitants should be included based on “the underlying purpose of the statute”). 
295. Carlson, supra note 2, at 301. 
296. Id. at 356. The same California statute that protects employees but not independent 
contractors from discrimination in hiring and firing, for example, extends protections against harassment 
to “person[s] providing services pursuant to a contract.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(j)(1). 
297. Carlson, supra note 2, at 301. Other proposals are content merely to subtract the rights that 
do not make sense, while continuing to distribute the bulk through the status itself. See, e.g., Estlund, 












permanent union.298 Every change to the positive law of a status has the 
potential to affect the status’s coherence with respect to the functions the 
status is expected to perform.299 The more coherent the status, the more 
effective it will be at governing conduct and serving its intended 
purposes.300 
Proponents of disaggregation rarely ask about the impact on the other 
regulatory features of the status. Carlson, for example, assumes that 
“[e]mployee status matters mainly because our employment laws make it 
matter,”301 without considering whether the concept of employment helps 
to regulate behavior beyond merely being a conduit for rights. He does not 
ask whether a relatively stable and capacious conception of employment 
helps workers to figure out their obligations, such as tax filing, or what 
duties are owed to them by their employers, such as family leave benefits.302 
Similarly, proposals to disaggregate marital rights have not first articulated 
answers to the questions, “What do we want marriage to do, and what is 
marriage capable of doing?”303 It may well be that disaggregation would 
improve regulation, but we cannot simply jump to that conclusion. 
B. One Form or Many? 
As discussed above, statuses impose mandatory consequences—
awarding benefits or imposing burdens at least some of which are beyond 
the power of the parties to change. Under a binary approach, the law chooses 
between the two options and imposes legal consequences accordingly. In 
contrast, a pluralistic approach would regulate work and intimate 
relationships through multiple statuses.  
 
298. See James Herbie DiFonzo, Unbundling Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 31, 41–44 (2003); 
Matsumura, supra note 29, at 481. 
299. See Matsumura, supra note 29, at 473–74, 483–84; see also Abrams, supra note 207, at 64 
(suggesting that “[w]e could . . . think about what combinations of functional categories might ideally 
make up modern marriage, and which categories we could instead split off altogether”); Vivian 
Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 307, 313–14 (2004) 
(proposing to identify the functions marriage is expected to perform and to configure rights to serve 
those, and only those, functions); Lebrón, supra note 72, at 193 (arguing against the privileging of family 
forms instead of the social goods that the law should legitimately promote). For a discussion of these 
ideas within the context of parental status, see Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents, 41 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER 119, 133 (2018). 
300. See Matsumura, supra note 29, at 479. 
301. Carlson, supra note 2, at 368. 
302. Studies of the role of social norms in the regulation of employment relationships from 
contexts other than worker classification suggest that norms could be a valuable tool to educate workers 
about their legal rights and obligations. See Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning and Law: Exploring the 
Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 499–506. 
303. Abrams, supra note 207, at 64; see also Matsumura, supra note 29, at 473 (noting the 
importance of identifying a hierarchy of functions marriage performs before assessing the desirability 
of changes to the positive law of marriage). But see Hamilton, supra note 299 (identifying functions of 
marriage and arguing that some should be disregarded). 











Scholars have offered several arguments in favor of pluralism. The 
dominant argument is rooted in autonomy. Increasing the number of 
statuses increases the range of options available for people from which to 
choose.304 A multiplicity of options is important for several reasons. First, 
it recognizes that the world is composed of a plurality of goods, many of 
which are incommensurable.305 Because these goods cannot be ranked, the 
law cannot determine that one is best, requiring that the choice be made 
instead by people who hold different values.306 Second, people should be 
the authors of their own lives, and this authority requires meaningful options 
from which to choose.307 In fact, “[f]or choice to be effective, for autonomy 
to be meaningful, there must be (other things being equal) ‘more valuable 
options than can be chosen, and they must be significantly different.’”308 
Where statuses are defined by the state—and where most of the rights 
associated with those statuses fall beyond the scope of private agreements—
the state has a duty “to create a diversity of social institutions that enable 
the individual to make genuine and meaningful choices between various 
alternatives.” 309  Expanding options expands choice, which expands 
autonomy. 
There is a related utilitarian justification for a pluralistic approach. 
William Eskridge has argued that “most human beings potentially flourish 
in relationships, and American family law ought, presumptively, to provide 
a supportive context for such relationships and for the rearing of 
children.”310  Where different forms of relationships give rise to valued 
goods such as “pleasure, sociability, and collective advancement,” the law 
should sanction and support those forms of relationships.311 Eskridge notes 
that the law can support such beneficial relationships by promoting 
commitment and stability, providing efficient decision rules governing 
topics like medical decision making and inheritance, and protecting 
 
304. See, e.g., Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of 
Spousal Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1569 (2009). 
305. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM 30 (2002). Galston notes that pluralism is not 
the same as relativism. That is, there is “a nonarbitrary distinction between good and bad or good and 
evil.” Id. Within the realm of genuine goods, however, ranking may not be possible. Id.; see also Erez 
Aloni, The Puzzle of Family Law Pluralism, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 317, 328 (2016). 
306. See GALSTON, supra note 305, at 30–31; Lifshitz, supra note 304, at 1571 (noting the 
importance of state “tolerance for couples’ life-styles”). 
307. See HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 69 (2017) 
(citing JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 372 (1986)); Lifshitz, supra note 304, at 1593. 
308. DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 307, at 69. 
309. Lifshitz, supra note 304, at 1593 (characterizing this duty as a positive obligation rather than 
the negative duty to refrain from imposing formal limitations on individual choice); see also RAZ, supra 
note 307, at 265 (noting the importance of multiple frameworks to support choice). 
310. Eskridge, supra note 101, at 1890. 












vulnerable persons. 312  Many of the proponents of pluralism appear to 
endorse this utilitarian justification, proceeding under a sort of “is as ought” 
view 313  in which the legal structures ought to arise to reflect evolving 
relationship structures.314  
A binary choice regime could also deter beneficial conduct in situations 
where a person would be willing to engage in some, but not all, of the 
conduct necessitated by the binary choice. Lee Fennell observes that “[i]f a 
socially beneficial [option] falls just short of being privately worthwhile, it 
may not be produced at all—even if the actor would have been willing to 
undertake most of the socially desirable action if it had been sliced up into 
smaller increments, with proportionate costs and benefits attached to each 
increment.”315 Uber, for instance, has expressed a willingness to provide 
medical and disability coverage for injuries suffered on the job, as well as 
antidiscrimination protections and other benefits. 316  If required to treat 
drivers as employees or independent contractors, though, it will opt for the 
latter.317 
Finally, tying together this Section and the previous, a plurality of 
statuses may have the effect of making differences between the options less 
consequential, essentially making any given status matter less as compared 
to the others. Such a move would likely disrupt social hierarchies. 318 
Additionally, with less riding on a single privileged status, lawmakers might 
be less reluctant to experiment with and revise the various options. 
Corporate law provides an example of both pluralism and an openness to 
experimentation. State statutes typically distinguish between domestic and 
 
312. See id. at 1946–47. 
313. Cf. Barbara Fried, Is as Ought: The Case of Contracts, 92 VA. L. REV. 1375, 1389 (2006) 
(noting the tendency to confuse “what is” for “what ought to be”). 
314. See, e.g., Jessica R. Feinberg, Avoiding Marriage Tunnel Vision, 88 TUL. L. REV. 257, 273 
(2013) (noting that some advocates of same-sex relationship recognition called for the recognition of 
many different kinds of relationships in furtherance of equality); David J. Herzig, Marriage Pluralism: 
Taxing Marriage After Windsor, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3 (2014) (noting that the creation of new legal 
approaches arose to accommodate “new social pluralism”). 
315. FENNELL, supra note 292, at 74. 
316. See Dara Khosrowshahi, Opinion, I Am the C.E.O. of Uber. Gig Workers Deserve Better, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/10/opinion/uber-ceo-dara-khosrowsha 
hi-gig-workers-deserve-better.html [https://perma.cc/622E-ZUZE]. 
317. Several scholars have engaged this question in the family law realm. Linda McClain has 
analyzed whether allowing partners to calibrate (or tailor) their levels of commitment will “have a 
detrimental effect on marriage as an aspirational model of commitment.” MCCLAIN, supra note 293, at 
208. She concludes that the benefits of allowing partners to tailor their commitments would “advance 
personal goods like security and caring for others, as well as social goods like ensuring care in the case 
of incapacity or providing financially for one’s survivors.” Id. at 209. Mary Charlotte Carroll has argued, 
in the marriage context, that many individuals may want some of marriage’s rights and obligations, but 
might stop short of marriage because it is just “too much.” See Carroll, supra note 191, at 483–88. 
318. See id. at 507–13 (examining the growth in popularity of the French pacte civil de solidarité 
and Belgian legal cohabitation statuses as alternatives to marriage). 











foreign corporations, as well as for-profit and nonprofit corporations.319 
They also impose different rules for closely held corporations. 320 
Corporations may fall into additional types, including public or private, 
professional, municipal, religious, educational, charitable, and more.321 The 
law is constantly evolving, creating new forms of business entities such as 
limited liability companies, limited liability partnerships, and limited 
liability limited partnerships.322 In an already pluralistic system, the creation 
of new forms hardly seems problematic. 
There are several arguments against a pluralistic approach. I have 
previously argued that limiting the number of statuses or forms can help to 
settle parties’ expectations and convey information about that status’s legal 
content.323 My argument builds on the work of Thomas Merrill and Henry 
Smith, who have hypothesized that property rights track a limited number 
of standard forms—what they call the numerus clausus—to reduce the costs 
of processing information about those rights.324 Merrill and Smith argue that 
standardization of rights makes it easier to determine the duties arising from 
a particular piece of property and to identify the appropriate rightsholder.325 
Although scholars have taken aim at this influential theory, most agree that 
the numerus clausus facilitates the acquisition of important information 
even if they disagree on how and for what purpose that information should 
be used.326 When it comes to the regulation of the family, the numerus 
clausus of marriage satisfies various informational needs, including notice 
to the spouses themselves that they are actually married; notice to the 
spouses of the legal duties that they owe to the state, third parties, and each 
other; and notice to third parties that the spouses are married.327  
The opposite of the numerus clausus—a proliferation of statuses—can 
be cognitively taxing, and may impair choice by making it too difficult to 
comprehend the various options.328 Even if the number of options does not 
rise to the level of cognitive overload, the presence of multiple statuses 
poses two risks: first, that people (including the parties to the relationship 
as well as third parties) will not understand the differences between the 
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320. See id. 
321. See id. § 49. 
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323. See Matsumura, supra note 29, at 497. 
324. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: 
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3–8 (2000). 
325. See id. at 8. 
326. See Matsumura, supra note 29, at 499. 
327. Id. at 500. Guy Davidov has pointed out the importance of the informational function in the 
employment context, noting that a “unified concept” of employment “makes it possible for people to 
know their status and rights.” Davidov, supra note 29, at 133, 150. 
328. See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 307, at 128 (discussing the problem of cognitive 












options or will manipulate the boundaries between them;329 and second, to 
the extent that inclusion is subject to fact-intensive determinations, that 
adjudication will be complicated and costly.330 In either case, a pluralistic 
approach may destabilize expectations unless the different statuses and their 
entry requirements are distinct and well-defined.331  
These considerations should guide debates over whether to address 
worker classification and relationship recognition problems through the 
introduction of additional statuses. In particular, policymakers should 
analyze whether additional statuses would expand meaningful choice or 
interfere with it; and promote beneficial relationships or gamesmanship and 
status arbitrage. 
In the relationship context, I have argued, based on these considerations, 
that proposals to allow spouses to dictate the legal consequences of their 
own marriages (creating an infinite variation of marital statuses)332 or to 
promote the proliferation of nonmarital statuses could end up impacting 
both autonomy and relationship stability.333 After a certain point, whether 
three or four or more, the addition of statuses could make it difficult for 
people to understand the legal significance of their relationship, interfering 
with their ability to make a self-defining choice.334 It would also make it 
more difficult for third parties to determine the consequences of interacting 
with the partners, imposing investigation costs and preventing them from 
enforcing social norms.335 In short, the status options must be meaningfully 
distinct.336 
California’s domestic partnership status is an example of what could 
have been. It currently provides registrants with the same rights and 
responsibilities as married couples under state law.337 The initial version of 
 
329. See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 307, at 129. 
330. Katharine Baker has observed that many family law rules of decision have grown more 
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Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 489 (1983) (noting the 
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333. See Matsumura, supra note 29, at 513. I have argued that the same concerns arise from 
allowing spouses to enter agreements governing the property consequences of their marriage, which 
might be a reason to restrict certain types of marital contracts. See id. at 518. 
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the law, however, included a much more limited set of rights: domestic 
partners were allowed to register their relationship, to obtain coverage under 
state health and benefit plans if they were state employees, and to visit their 
partners in hospitals without fear of being turned away.338 The early version 
of domestic partnership shows that a status with a different and more limited 
set of rights is possible to enact and would recognize a very different type 
of relationship.339 
The same principles should be used to assess proposals to create alternate 
statuses to employment. Seth Harris and Alan Krueger, for example, have 
proposed the creation of a status for “independent workers.”340 The status 
would apply to workers who find themselves in a triangular relationship 
between customers needing a service (e.g. a car ride or food delivery) and 
an intermediary, typically a technology company (e.g. Uber or 
Postmates).341 Harris and Krueger propose that these independent workers 
be allowed to collectively bargain and receive civil rights protections, and 
that intermediaries be allowed to withhold taxes and opt into workers’ 
compensation regimes, but that the workers would not be subject to wage 
and hour protections or unemployment insurance, among other things.342  
That the status would turn on a highly salient feature of the parties’ 
relationship minimizes the likelihood that the additional status would cause 
confusion or dilute the meaning of the existing statuses. The rights and 
obligations also appear to be tailored to the specific features of the 
relationship like the fact that the relevant unit of compensation may be 
measured in services performed (like deliveries or rides) rather than hours 
worked. However, because workers and firms would not be able to choose 
the worker’s employment status, whether the Harris and Krueger proposal 
better protects party autonomy rests completely on whether a greater 
number prefer it to the other options. And although workers would receive 
collective bargaining rights and civil rights protections, among other things, 
one might still ask whether the benefits to workers optimally protect them 
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339. Cf. Melissa Murray, Paradigms Lost: How Domestic Partnership Went from Innovation to 
Injury, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 291, 300–03 (2013). 
340. Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-
First-Century Work: The “Independent Worker” (The Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper No. 2015-
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from exploitation while still allowing the firms to make reasonable profits. 
Nonetheless, solutions like these appear to reap several benefits of a 
pluralistic approach. 
C. Who Is in? 
After the law determines the scope of the status or statuses, it must also 
decide second-order questions pertaining to the administration of those 
statuses. One aspect of this inquiry focuses on how to determine whether a 
person falls within a status category. A second aspect regulates the transition 
between statuses. 
1. Timing, Tests, and Decision-Makers 
As discussed above, firms and workers cannot definitively classify a 
worker as an employee or independent contractor at the outset of their 
relationship. Instead, employment status is only ever definitively 
established at some later time through a judicially administered, fact-
intensive test. 343  Marriage, by contrast, has moved in the direction of 
formality. That means that nonmarital partners have not invoked formalities 
otherwise available to them.344 Like employment status, disputes therefore 
arise at the end of the relationship, whether due to dissolution or death.345  
The comparison between these contexts reveals several design variables: 
timing, the role of formalities, and institutional actors. 
On the question of timing, the determination whether a person falls 
within a particular status can be made at the beginning of the relationship—
ex ante—or sometime down the road—ex post. A primary benefit of ex ante 
determination is that the parties “know the legal rules before they act” rather 
than having to wait “until litigation has been completed.” 346  They can 
therefore adjust their behavior accordingly.  
The benefits of ex ante determinations become clearer when considering 
the costs delaying the determination. Ex ante ambiguity increases the 
likelihood of horizontal inequity: the possibility that similarly situated 
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people will be treated differently.347 For every status determination that is 
adjudicated by the courts, many more relationships end without oversight. 
Workers who could be classified as employees and intimate partners who 
could establish implied agreements to share property as if married will never 
bring those claims. Similarly situated relationships may therefore result in 
completely different legal treatment. This inconsistency impedes the 
development of clear social norms around these statuses: if people who are 
similarly situated are treated differently under the law, then it becomes 
difficult to identify particular factual characteristics and circumstances with 
particular statuses.348 The lack of clear norms deprives the law of a powerful 
enforcement mechanism that would otherwise be available to reinforce the 
status.349 
Leaving status adjudications to later in the relationship, if ever, also 
affects the rights of the State and third parties. Take an example from the 
family law context. Suppose that a cohabiting couple shares a residence and 
pools earnings and expenses, but does not get legally married because they 
would owe more in federal taxes or one of them would become ineligible 
for Supplemental Security Income payments. 350  The chance that the 
government will pursue these individuals for back taxes or benefits is 
extremely low, because many of the underlying facts will not be presented 
to the relevant decision makers.351 The government is therefore deprived of 
resources to which it might otherwise be entitled. An ex post enforcement 
regime relies heavily on individuals within putative status relationships to 
bring the relationships to the law’s attention when they seek judicial 
resolution of private disputes, but most people are simply not motivated to 
bring these challenges. 
Yet ex post determination has its benefits. As Adam Cox and Eric Posner 
have observed, ex ante screening systems are based on limited information 
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and may therefore be less accurate. Statuses aim to regulate relationships 
marked by certain traits, whether that is control, interdependency, 
vulnerability, commitment, or a combination of those and other traits. In 
making its classification decisions, the goal of the legal system is to 
accurately match the desired trait(s) with the appropriate status.352 Cox and 
Posner note that ex ante, it might be difficult to determine whether a 
particular individual belongs to a particular status because that person might 
not know whether she possesses the relevant traits, or may actively be trying 
to conceal that information. 353  They use as an example whether an 
immigrant is assimilable—she may not know whether she will fit in or, if 
she plans to commit crimes in the country, she will not say.354 A gig worker 
might be in the same boat at the outset of the relationship—she might not 
currently plan to work a full schedule on the technology company platform; 
likewise, a nonmarital partner might not know whether the relationship will 
develop into one of mutual dependency. We will always know more about 
the nature of an employment or nonmarital relationship when a dispute 
arises than at the outset. 
A related design question has to do with the use of formalities. 
Formalities provide several benefits. In his classic work, Consideration and 
Form, Lon Fuller argued that formalities serve three functions: evidentiary, 
cautionary, and channeling.355 Whether through a writing, attestation, or 
notarization, a formality provides evidence of the thing that matters.356 
Formalities also act “as a check against inconsiderate action.”357  Fuller 
refers to the gravity of affixing and impressing the wax seal; more than one 
movie has featured a wedding ceremony inducing “cold feet.” Finally, 
formalities focus the parties’ attention such that proof of formalities 
becomes proof of the thing itself.358 In marriage, this is the license and 
ceremony.359 Jessica Clarke has argued that this channeling function has 
implications for public ordering as well: “by informing parties of the steps 
they should take to claim a particular legal status,” formalities ensure that 
people will end up in uniform status categories, making it easier to 
administer the legal consequences that flow therefrom.360  
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356. Id. at 800; see also Clarke, supra note 344, at 771. 
357. Fuller, supra note 355, at 800. 
358. Id. at 801. 
359. Matsumura, supra note 166, at 2011. 
360. Clarke, supra note 344 at 773, 786. 











Like ex ante determinations, formalities can enhance autonomy by 
facilitating self-defining choice, reducing uncertainty about the legal 
consequences of one’s actions, and encouraging parties to make 
relationship-specific investments that they might otherwise avoid. 361 
Formalities also promote autonomy by reducing the possibility of judicial 
or other forms of interference. Mary Anne Case has observed that 
formalities provide spouses who invoke them with substantial freedom to 
structure their relationships as they see fit. Wielding a marriage license, a 
married couple “is by and large free to have or not have sex, vaginal or not, 
procreative, contracepted, or otherwise; to be faithful or not, to divorce and 
remarry, to commingle their finances or keep them separate, to live together 
or separately,” and more, all while being recognized as married by the 
state.362 To put it another way, formalities shield people in a relationship 
from prying inquiries about the nature of their relationship, assuming one 
can take advantage of them.363 Conduct-based tests, in contrast, provide 
opportunities for the state to express more fine-grained views about the 
“proper” nature of the regulated relationships.364  
This same shielding function becomes a problem, however, if one of the 
parties to the relationship is vulnerable to exploitation or abuse. Tests based 
on the conduct of the parties allow courts to peer behind the parties’ status 
determinations, providing some degree of protection for the more 
vulnerable parties.365 Whether to rely on formalities therefore depends on 
the risk that one of the parties will engage in status arbitrage or other forms 
of exploitation. 
A final consideration is whether to commit the classification decision to 
courts or other entities. Clerks or ministerial officials rather than courts 
currently process marriage licenses; courts or adjudicative bodies rather 
than ministerial officials determine employment status. But the law could 
 
361. See Matsumura, supra note 166, at 2030–31. 
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363. See Baker, What Is Nonmarriage?, supra note 330, at 203–04. The fact that many states 
amended their marriage laws to restrict same-sex couples from obtaining marriage licenses shows that 
formalities can also communicate its expectations about ideal relationships. The point here, though, is 
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364. Some jurisdictions will actually impose marriage on formally unmarried people in order to 
prevent them from engaging in conduct the law disapproves, whether failing to support an intimate 
partner, see Dutko v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-10698, 2015 WL 6750792 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 5, 2015) (treating 
a cohabiting couple as married under Social Security Administration guidelines in order to deprive one 
of the partners of Supplemental Security Income benefits), or living in a polyamorous relationship, see 
State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820 (Utah 2004) (in which the state applied the common law marriage statute to 
an avowed polygamist who avoided being formally married to more than one wife at a time in order to 
prosecute him for bigamy).  
365. Yuval Feldman, Ex-Ante vs. Ex-Post: Optimizing State Intervention in Exploitive Triangular 
Employment Relationships, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 751, 757 (2009) (noting the pressure 












manipulate these pairings to allow courts to perform ex ante determinations 
of status, or parties to register their relationships after the fact.366 The main 
considerations are cost and expertise: courts have the tools to examine 
complicated and conflicting factual accounts, but those inquiries are also 
resource-intensive. 
The foregoing insights help to sharpen analysis of status reform 
proposals. When it comes to the regulation of nonmarital relationships, most 
scholarly attention has focused on ex post solutions.367 A common objection 
to the imposition of obligations on cohabitants after the fact is that it 
interferes with individual autonomy.368 Many cohabitants, however, are not 
deciding to enter a relationship because of expectations about the legal 
consequences of their relationship or making a conscious choice to enter a 
particular type of relationship at all.369 The lack of clear ex ante rules is not 
thwarting their attempts to plan a concrete course of action (not having one 
anyway). A more serious objection is that significant legal consequences—
including redistribution of property titled in their name—are being imposed 
without notice: the law has not assisted them in choosing that 
consequence.370 Another problem with the ex post approach is that it invites 
invasive, moralistic inquiries in an area—the regulation of intimacy—where 
the Court has told us we should be especially concerned about states passing 
judgment.371 The inquiries are also likely to be inefficient in two, mutually 
exclusive respects: first, many people who fit the definition will never come 
to the courts’ attention,372 meaning that the ex post approach will not be 
accomplishing its objectives; second, adjudications will be fact-intensive, 
consuming party and judicial resources.373 
 
366. Courts already perform some ex ante status determinations. For example, they approve 
adoptions, see DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, NAOMI R. CAHN, CATHERINE J. ROSS & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, 
CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 377–78 (5th ed. 2019), and, in some jurisdictions, pre-approve surrogacy 
contracts that confer parental rights, see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(e) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 
372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
367. But see Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573 (2013); Culhane, supra 
note 189. 
368. See Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of 
Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 856 (2005). 
369. Joslin, supra note 225, at 971–72 (citing social science research suggesting that cohabitants 
“slide” into their relationships). 
370. See Lifshitz, supra note 304, at 1593. 
371. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (condemning efforts by the state to “seek 
to control a personal relationship” or “define the meaning of the relationship”). 
372. See, e.g., Antognini, supra note 21 (noting the small number of nonmarital contracts cases). 
373. See Baker, What Is Nonmarriage?, supra note 330, at 205, 222–24. 












Related to the question of how to determine whether someone is a 
member of the relevant identity group—really, a question about entrance—
is the question about how to facilitate exit—really, a question about 
transition. Rules can reinforce the connections between parties (what I will 
call tethering rules) or facilitate portability and movement (what I will call 
transition rules). The choice of a tethering or transition rule can affect the 
ease with which people move between statuses. 
Tethering rules reinforce status relationships by encouraging the partners 
to become more interconnected or making it more difficult for them to 
disentangle from each other. Virtually all the legislative proposals to deal 
with worker classification in the face of gig employment fall under this 
description. 374  Making it easier to classify a worker as an employee 
promotes dependency on the employer. 375  Another critical focus of 
workers’ rights advocates has been to make it harder for employers to 
terminate workers, substituting “just cause” termination for “at-will” 
employment.376 By requiring terminations to be non-arbitrary, the just cause 
standard is another rule that tightens the relationship between worker and 
employer. There are also rules designed to encourage workers, as opposed 
to employers, to stay in an established relationship. Many retirement plans 
do not become the worker’s property immediately, but vest over time, either 
when a “cliff” is reached (for instance, three years of employment), or 
graded over time (for instance, 20% ownership after two years, 40% after 
three years, etc.).377 Many employee stock plans similarly vest over time, 
meaning that an employee will only realize the full value of stock options 
or stock-based compensation if she remains employed for a predetermined 
period of time.378 Although employers have the ability to set vesting rules, 
the parameters of those rules are determined by ERISA.379 Finally, pensions 
can be structured to promote an ongoing relationship between employer and 
 
374. See supra notes 181–184 (discussing legislation enacted or proposed in response to the online 
gig economy). 
375. See Estlund, supra note 236, at 325 (noting that the “signature features” of the standard 
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376. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
1, 9–11 (2010) (identifying just cause employment as one of the signature accomplishments of organized 
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377. See Retirement Topics – Vesting, IRS (June 18, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/ 
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worker, even after workers retire. General Electric, for example, is 
responsible for paying billions of dollars in lifetime benefits to close to 
400,000 former employees.380 The former employees remain dependent on 
GE and its continuing solvency.381 
Family law has its tethering rules as well. Marital property rules make 
spouses economic partners by subjecting property earned during the 
marriage to equitable division and holding spouses liable for marital 
debts. 382  States impose waiting periods for no-fault divorce, literally 
extending the period in which the spouses are treated as a unit.383 Alimony 
extends one spouse’s support obligation beyond the end of the marital 
relationship, in some instances making a former spouse support the other 
for an indefinite period of time. 384  Proposals to impose status-based 
obligations on cohabitants extend marital property and alimony rules to 
people in marriage-like relationships. The ALI Principles, for example, 
would, for the most part, apply marital property rules when dividing 
property between cohabitants, 385  and would treat them the same for 
purposes of awarding alimony.386 
Tethering rules encourage parties to stay in the relationship and promote 
dependency by making it more difficult for parties to avoid their obligations 
to each other. However, they have several downsides. They function less 
effectively if the parties ultimately control entrance and exit from the 
relationship. Even just cause termination rules, for instance, do not provide 
much protection to workers because of the difficulty of proving arbitrary 
termination.387 If responsibilities end with the relationship, then the more 
vulnerable party faces a potentially steep drop-off. If the rules instead 
promote contact between the parties after they have exited the status, that 
has its own drawbacks. The financial fate of the former GE employees 
discussed above, for instance, turns on the ability of the company’s current 
managers to preserve the company’s solvency. And alimony promotes 
 
380. Thomas Gryta, GE to Freeze Pensions for 20,000 Workers, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2019, 5:15 
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383. See id. at 535. 
384. See, e.g., Broemer v. Broemer, 109 So. 3d 284, 289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that a 
long-term marriage gives rise to a presumption of permanent alimony that lasts until the death of either 
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385. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 224, § 6.04–.05 (discussing characterization and division of 
property). 
386. Id. § 6.06. 
387. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 376, at 17–23. 











contact between the former spouses, sometimes also triggering litigation 
over modification or termination.388  
Finally, these rules often encourage inefficient investments of human 
capital. As David Charny has observed, in the 1980s and 1990s, firms faced 
“enormous overcapacity” in human capital assets: they had a glut of workers 
“with much experience in their jobs, whose skills produce[d] goods that 
[were] no longer in sufficiently great demand to justify full employment.”389 
Tethering rules make it more likely that this overcapacity will develop, 
along with the accompanying cutbacks that inevitably follow.390 A related 
problem arises in the family law realm: marriage, through a combination of 
marital property rules and gender norms, often induces one spouse, 
historically the wife, to invest in the other’s economic success in exchange 
for a deferred promise of shared gains in later years.391 That investment only 
makes sense if the marriage is likely to last, and many marriages do not. A 
rule preventing the creation of marital property would logically provide a 
greater incentive for both spouses to remain in the workforce, making it 
more likely that a person would be independently financially secure.392  
Transition rules would make it easier for parties to leave, or move 
between, status relationships. In contrast to the dominant legislative 
approach to the worker classification problem, which has focused on 
“shor[ing] up the fortress of employment,”393 many work law scholars have 
proposed rules making the transition between statuses or relationships less 
disruptive. Katherine Stone, for example, has argued that workers should 
focus on skill acquisition rather than job security.394 Job training, upskilling, 
networking opportunities, microlevel job control, and market-based pay all 
contribute to the worker’s ongoing employability.395  
With this in mind, Stone argues that attempts by former employers to 
control workers’ human capital should be scrutinized.396 Covenants not to 
compete, for example, can limit a worker’s postemployment opportunities 
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and ability to capitalize on the skills she has developed.397 Another barrier 
to worker mobility is discrimination. Unlike discrimination in the past, 
which could be observed within firms because of well-defined hierarchies 
(for instance, the failure to promote women and minorities, as evidenced by 
the absence of women and minorities in key positions), discrimination 
might take the form of unequal access to formal and informal training 
opportunities, as well as networking opportunities.398  
Rules protecting the ability to transition are central to addressing these 
types of harms. To this end, Stone proposes the adoption of a “workplace-
specific alternative dispute resolution [system] that uses a neutral outsider 
to scrutinize workplace conduct and apply equal opportunity norms.”399 
Similarly, Rachel Arnow-Richman has argued that employers should be 
required to provide advance notice of termination or continue to pay salary 
and benefits during the notice period.400 This protection would help workers 
to make the inevitable transition between jobs rather than encourage 
workers to get into a fight that they may not win over a job.  
Within the family law realm, few scholars have considered the 
desirability of transition rules as opposed to tethering rules. Yet it is 
important to at least consider whether and how to make it easier for people 
to exit relationships in a way that minimizes disruption and maximizes the 
collective benefit to the partners. If nonmarital relationships are less stable 
than marriages and more likely to last for a shorter length of time, it may be 
more common for couples to have to decide who remains in a rent-
controlled apartment, or what to do about a shared vehicle, than whether to 
divide the higher income owner’s accumulated property.401  
Under these circumstances, transition payments calculated based on how 
long it will take to get the displaced partner on his or her feet could be a 
better option than a rule premised on equitable distribution of assets and 
liabilities. 402  Policymakers could also consider procedural innovations 
 
397. See id. at 578–79. 
398. See id. at 605–08. 
399. Id. at 612. Stone notes that internal dispute resolution systems will often fail because the very 
perpetrators of the problematic conduct are placed in the position to adjudicate the claims. Yet the types 
of complaints at issue about marginalization or exclusion seem more like questions of etiquette than the 
types of acts that typically ground civil liability. An outside neutral with expertise in workplace disputes 
could thread this needle, resolving grievances through the application of evolving, external workplace 
norms. Id. 
400. Arnow-Richman, supra note 376, at 36–37. 
401. See Matsumura, supra note 15, at 1037–39 (noting that cohabitants have fewer assets than 
married couples, and many cohabitants will have little assets at all). 
402. What such a system would look like is beyond the scope of this Article. One might factor in 
expenses having to do with relocation, such as moving expenses, the costs of setting up a new household, 
or the difference between the previous and new housing costs. In some cases, this amount would be 
much lower than what an ex-partner would get if marital property rules applied, but not in all cases. If 
 











designed to resolve disputes between partners without onerous adjudication. 
Under the existing contract and status approaches, one partner must sue the 
other to recover a share of the other partner’s assets, a process which is 
likely to be contentious and costly. Instead, states could create an alternative 
dispute resolution system similar to the one proposed by Stone in the work 
context. 403  Another option would be to take a cue from California’s 
domestic partner laws, which allow domestic partners in California to file a 
Notice of Termination without judicial supervision if the partners do not 
share a common child and do not have significant property interests or 
liabilities.404 A reframing around transition brings to light these and other 
possibilities, which may otherwise have been obscured.  
EPILOGUE—TOWARD A BROADER STATUS CONSCIOUSNESS 
If status-based regulation is inevitable, then fights over status are 
inevitable as well. This Article ends with a reminder that those fights are 
interconnected in multiple respects. 
The starting point of this Article is the failure of two hoary statuses, 
marriage and employment, to extend rights and obligations to millions of 
people who bear striking similarities to those who are regulated. By 
focusing on the problem within the silos of work law and family law, 
insufficient attention has been paid to the ways in which the status-based 
approaches are failing as statuses. Just as importantly, the siloed view has 
hindered a discussion of the ways in which those statuses are mutually 
reinforcing. 
This phenomenon has been exposed for all to see by the COVID-19 
pandemic. Cohabitants on average have lower levels of education, lower 
incomes, and less stable jobs than married people.405 They are also in less 
stable unions, with the possibility of conflict only exacerbated by shelter-
in-place orders.406 As discussed above, technology companies like Uber do 
not pay into state unemployment systems, leaving many gig workers 
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without coverage under those systems.407 Many gig workers also fall within 
the essential worker category, which includes workers in healthcare 
facilities, farms, factories, grocery stores, and public transportation, and is 
disproportionately non-white. 408  Workers in the food and agricultural 
sector, which accounts for 20% of all essential workers, or more than 11 
million people, earn particularly low hourly wages,409  and a significant 
portion of them are gig workers.410 Many of them are also undocumented.411  
In short, those lacking protection because they fall outside of one type of 
favored status are somewhat more likely to lack protection under other 
favored statuses as well. Legal status and social status—while different 
concepts—are inextricably intertwined and mutually reinforcing. Although 
the evolution of marriage and employment are a testament to the possibility 
of incremental change, a broader status consciousness is needed to bring 
about more lasting, systemic change. 
It remains to be seen what results will be produced by the dual shocks of 
the COVID-19 pandemic and the heightened race consciousness triggered 
most recently by the killings of George Floyd and others. But there are some 
indications that lawmakers are willing to reconsider entrenched aspects of 
status in light of pressing realities. 
In response to widespread unemployment and underemployment 
brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress passed legislation 
providing stimulus payments to U.S. citizens and U.S. resident aliens with 
incomes below a threshold amount. 412  Congress also extended 
unemployment benefits to workers not typically eligible, including gig 
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workers. 413  These measures appear to recognize the importance of 
addressing economic hardship regardless of employment status. 
The intertwined health and financial crises brought about by the COVID-
19 pandemic have also prompted the federal government to provide paid 
family leave for employees with a “bona fide need to care for an individual 
subject to quarantine (pursuant to Federal, State, or local government order 
or advice of a health care provider) . . . .”414 As one might expect, the law 
covers spouses and children; perhaps surprisingly, however, eligibility is 
determined by caregiving. Cohabitants, and even mere roommates, can 
qualify. The law, like COVID-19, does not discriminate on the basis of 
family status. 
Although federal legislation has restricted coverage to U.S. citizens and 
others with preferred immigration statuses, some states have recognized the 
importance of supporting members of the community who would otherwise 
fall through the cracks. California, for example, has provided one-time, 
state-funded disaster relief assistance to approximately 100,000 
undocumented adults who are ineligible for other forms of assistance.415 
States, of course, have little power over immigration policy, but the popular 
sentiment reflected in California’s action suggests a shift in attitudes about 
citizenship and belonging. 
These developments show that the current tumult has awakened people 
to the shortcomings of the status frameworks that structure our lives. 
Though seemingly minimal and nascent, they signal a willingness to 
reconsider the relationships between statuses and the rights that flow from 
them. Now is the time to build on them. 
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